

RESEARCH ON OBSERVANCE OF QUALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY PRINCIPLES IN HUMANITARIAN SECTOR IN PAKISTAN



MANSOOR RAZA & IRFAN KHAN

APRIL 2011



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
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Preface

This report is part of a larger CWS-P/A program, Strengthening Humanitarian Assistance in Humanitarian Sector. The program seeks to promote quality and accountability principles for disaster management interventions in the region of Pakistan and Afghanistan through training, awareness raising, and promoting networks for accountability to relevant stakeholders, particularly to beneficiaries.

The report draws upon secondary sources and various reports of the government and nongovernmental sector of Pakistan. In addition, it draws upon previous work done by the authors and detailed interviews which have been carried out for this report. As per agreed Terms of Reference, the authors took the Pakistan Floods-2010 as a case study for exploring the question of what works and what does not work in pursuit of quality and accountability in disaster related interventions. The authors also visited affected areas of Swat, Naushehro Feroze, Kohistan, Khairpur, and Dadu and interacted with the local population, CBOs, and field offices of NGOs and INGOs. Those visits took place during the period of September 21, 2010 to December 22, 2010. The interviews, presentations, focus group discussions, and e-mail queries continued until March 18, 2011.

Keeping in view the qualitative nature of queries, attempts were made to collect the opinion of more than one hundred fifty respondents, including representatives of fifty-one organizations, and triangulation was accomplished across the cross section of relevant actors. The interviewees were carefully chosen so as to represent beneficiaries, implementing partners, and grant making bodies who are involved in Floods-2010 response, and management. Those persons were identified by researchers during the course of discussions with representatives of various NGOs and, at times, sporadically in field areas.

The authors acknowledge the extensive support provided by CWS-P/A. The authors also extend their gratitude to all those who could not be named because of space limitations and who accompanied this adventurous and tumultuous journey of fact-finding: right from drivers to the beneficiaries and to the grass-roots activists.

Taking advantage of hindsight analysis, it would be unfair not to acknowledge the magnificent role played by I/NGOs, local CBOs, and other actors. This research project is only an attempt to add value to the future endeavours from quality and accountability perspectives by closely looking into

Executive Summary

Pakistan is home to many natural hazards, hence, disasters. In July 2010, Pakistan was devastated by the worst ever floods. An unprecedented twenty million people were affected. The damage profile can be summarized as follows:

- The flood affected a total of seventy-eight districts, and twenty-nine of them were declared as the worst affected.
- Though there were no major epidemics or breakdown of law and order situation, the death toll reported was 1,985 and another 2,946 as injured.
- 1.7 million houses were damaged, and 2.2 million hectares of cultivated land was devastated.

Immediately after the catastrophe, national and international humanitarian organizations activated disaster management and provided relief items and services. In the aftermath of any disaster, multi-pronged actions are initiated by humanitarian agencies. The activities of humanitarian managers are informed by various standards and codes for prodigious outputs. From 1947 to 2010, thirty-two major initiatives were taken to improve the quality, accountability, and learning from good practices in the humanitarian sector. Some widely known initiatives include the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP), Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP), People In Aid, and the Sphere Project.

Taking Floods-2010 as a reference point, the research was designed to answer two key questions:

1. About the level of observance of Q&A principles, and
2. Factors that enable (or discourage) observance of Q&A principles.

The research was primarily qualitative in which data was collected through semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, and e-mail queries from beneficiaries, organizations (with or without significant Q&A capacities), aid workers, and disaster response experts. Besides Islamabad, Karachi, and Hyderabad, the field areas selected for the purpose of the interviews were villages and small towns of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Sindh. Quantitative information was also collected from humanitarian organizations. The research was constrained by a lack of secondary data on the practice of Q&A principles in Pakistan, difficult access to some flood-affected areas, and unavailability of financial data specific to Q&A. The research techniques employed were individual interviews, on-site observations, focus group discussions, and presentations at various forums.

The absence of a well-thought-out response often paves the way for ad hoc, unsystematic methods in humanitarian interventions, as witnessed in initial assessments, which form the foundation of the entire process of disaster management. Inaccessibility to the disaster-affected areas, cultural restrictions, the absence of experienced staff, reliance (in some cases) on local influential persons

for information, and consideration for logistical ease were major challenges. At times, there was an unwelcome streak of contractor-ship on the part of the implementing agencies, which is an obstruction in the promotion of quality and accountability standards. Moreover, at the national level, all-inclusive vulnerability analysis and hazard mapping with accurate demographic profiles was also a major shortfall. The aforementioned factors accrued to the oft-cited mismatch of what was needed on the ground and what was provided to the survivors, thus, adversely affecting an important indicator of response and targeting. Moreover, ample anecdotal and other evidence suggests that exclusion and inclusion errors were not uncommon.

To include voices of women and children in response and targeting and to eliminate discrimination against minorities and different sects were additional challenges for an increasingly polarized society. One-size-fits-all approach in design of relief packages actually added to the survivors' sense of deprivation, reducing them only to the status of mere recipient with no voice in decision making. The situation in formal and managed camps was significantly better, where everyone was counted and was provided with similar level of response.

The complaints handling systems witnessed few written complaints, as most of the complainants preferred verbal communication. There is increased awareness among the aid providers that the complaints handling system needs to be established in a way that enables beneficiaries to lodge complaints and receive satisfactory responses.

Typically, monitoring of humanitarian interventions is quantitative in nature and tends to forego how the targets are met. Besides, monitoring is largely perceived as donor-steered and, thus, kills the dynamics of learning. Need was identified to enhance management commitment to spare staff time and allocate resources for consolidated and coherent learning.

Transparency is definitely at work but only selectively. The final expression of achievements and losses (genus of reports) is not shared with disaster survivors—the ultimate stakeholders. Preaching by practice is the only way for assuring accountability in humanitarian work as aid workers are perpetually and relentlessly monitored by the community members.

The challenges to ensure quality and accountability in humanitarian interventions are both at conceptual and methodological levels and can be summarized as follows:

- To raise awareness about the concepts, methods, language, and procedures of Q&A is a vast challenge.
- To translate commitment of international donors and grant making bodies into visible means for implementing agencies.
- To promote rights based approach at grass-roots level; providing feedback to aid agencies is a right not a privilege.
- To bring quality and accountability to the heart of the value system of organizations and not to understand it in activity terms.

After lengthy deliberations, researchers reached the following conclusions:

- With few exceptions, the level of observance of Q&A was found to be low across the myriad actors in the humanitarian sector.
- Q&A principles depend upon the values and ethos of an organization, and there is no shortcut.

- Organizations are showing a potential to be a role model, and it will take some time for the potential to be realized to its maximum.
- The flag carriers will have to be more transparent and accountable if they would like Q&A to gain more ground; preaching with practice appears to be the order of the day.

Based on the narrative of the report, the following are the wide-ranging recommendations:

- Intense lobbying needs to be done with donors for the availability of technical and financial resources for Q&A.
- Extensive handholding and capacity building of implementing organizations in pre-disaster periods, through training and provision of literature, is strictly necessary.
- Non-disaster periods should be utilized to consolidate learning and for making Q&A more contextual through reflections. It is essential to make an umbrella coordinating group for the purpose of sharing learning, increasing outreach, and contextualizing the paradigm.
- Understanding and devising ways to implement Q&A concepts should be a part of capacity building/organizational development programs.

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Abbreviations and Local Terms

ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
ALWG	Accountability Learning Working Group
AMRDO	All-Mehran Rural Development Organization
ASRO	Advocacy Support and Research Program
BASIC	BASIC Foundation
CBP	Capacity Building Program
CSSP	Civil Society Support Project
CWS-P/A	Church World Service - Pakistan/Afghanistan
DMP	Disaster Management Program
DNA	Damage Need Assessment
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EQ-2005	Earthquake – 2005
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Area
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FIs	Food Items
GB	Gilgit-Baltistan
GoP	Government of Pakistan
GRDO	Green Rural Development Organization
HAP	Humanitarian Accountability Partnership
HRCP	Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
HRDN	Human Resource Development Network
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IIRE	Indus Institute of Research and Education
INGOs	International Nongovernmental Organizations
IOM	International Organization for Migration

IRADO	Integrated Rural Awareness and Development Organization
ISDR	International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction
KP	Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, formerly North West Frontier Province
LWR	Lutheran World Relief
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NDMA	National Disaster Management Authority
NFIs	Non-Food Items
NRSP	National Rural Support Program
OD	Organization Development
PCE	Pakistan Coalition for Education
PHF	Pakistan Humanitarian Forum
PVDP	Participatory Village Development Program
Q&A	Quality and Accountability
RDPI	Rural Development Policy Institute
RSPNs	Rural Support Program Networks
RWF	Root Work Foundation
SAFWCO	Sindh Agriculture and Forestry Workers Coordinating Organization
SCI	Save the Children International
SEWA-Pak	The Society for Safe Environment & Welfare of Agrarians in Pakistan formerly the LSRDA
SHA	Strengthening Humanitarian Assistance
SHESW	Society for Health & Education and Social Works
SIs	Support Institutions
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SPO	Strengthening Participatory Organization
SRSP	Sindh Rural Support Program
WIRE	Wilson Institute of Research and Education
LOCAL TERMS	
<i>Khanapuri</i>	For the sake-of-it activity
<i>Patwar</i>	A revenue collection unit at local level



SECTION - ONE

INTRODUCTION

Disasters and Pakistan

Disaster patterns in Pakistan are related to its geography. The country can be divided into four broad geographical areas. These are the northern mountains, the western highlands, the Indus plains, and the eastern deserts. Each of these divisions can be further sub-divided into smaller geographical entities. (See Map – 1: Pakistan: Geographical Region and Map) Landslides and earthquakes are more common in northern regions whereas floods are a particularity of central plains and southern regions. Drought and famine persist in south western parts and southern areas of the country. Pakistan is vulnerable to most natural hazards. It is prone to floods, earthquakes, droughts, and cyclone storms, to name a few. Being densely populated, the impact of these natural phenomena is widely felt in the country. The other disasters that hit the country often but are under-reported in media are deforestation, sea intrusion, lightning, lowering of water tables, and landslides.

The literature suggests that from 1900 to 1974 a total of twenty-seven events of major disasters were recorded in Pakistan during which 83,633 people were killed and 6,031,602 were affected. From 1975 to 2001 a total of eighty-one events were recorded during which 9,331 people lost their lives and another 37,672,406 were affected. Floods claimed the largest chunk of the pie.¹ Disaster in politically unstable areas makes an emergency complex, as happened in parts of war-torn Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, where the onslaught of gushing waters added to the miseries of an already suffering population from Taliban insurgency and making humanitarian operations more difficult. Sindh, the southern province of Pakistan, is a case in point where in one hundred fifty-seven years (from 1843 to 2002), it was struck thirty-eight times by ten types of disasters:² those include wars, internal conflicts, floods, droughts, cyclones, epidemics, earthquakes, water-logging, wild fires, and wild storms.

Three major disasters that struck most recently in Pakistan are Kashmir Earthquake (2005), KP-IDP (Internally Displaced Persons) Crisis (2009), and Floods-2010. The Kashmir Earthquake, near the city of Muzaffarabad, also affected Gilgit-Baltistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province of Pakistan in which a 7.6 magnitude earthquake struck the India-Pakistan border with more than one hundred forty aftershocks, causing extensive damage in Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan. According to official sources, casualties were 79,000 (18th deadliest earthquake of all time), more than 106,000 were injured, and more than 3.3 million people were left homeless.³

1. Data compiled from authors' previous work on disaster management. See, for example, Raza (2005), Raza (2007) and Kehar (2010).
2. Further details at <http://blogs.tribune.com.pk/story/941/the-disaster-waiting-in-sindh%E2%80%99s-wings/>
3. Print media sources and conversation with National Disaster Management Authority Personnel

Between August 2008 and September 2009, conflict between the Government of Pakistan and militants in Bajaur and Mohmand agencies in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), and Swat, Buner, and Lower Dir districts in KP (earlier referred as NWFP) resulted in widespread population displacement and insecurity. During the IDP Crisis in 2009, 2.7 million conflict-displaced individuals were from KP and FATA, and those were in addition to 77,000 displaced people from South Waziristan.

Lastly, floods that began in July 2010 following heavy monsoon rains in KP, Sindh, Punjab, and Balochistan affected the Indus River basin. About twenty million people were affected, mostly by destruction of property, livelihood, and infrastructure, with a death toll of close to 2,000. As Floods-2010 is the reference point for this research project, it will be described in much detail in the upcoming sections.

1.1 Background

Pre-disaster stages of the discipline of disaster management include vulnerability and hazard analysis, preparedness, and mitigation. These are not discussed here as those are not in the scope of the report. Similarly, the various phases of search and rescue, immediate relief, reconstruction, and rehabilitation are also not discussed for the brevity of the write-up.

The onslaught of any disaster invites multi-pronged actions on the part of humanitarian agencies. However, the most followed, traditional route by the same, goes, with little variations, as follows:

1. To collect preliminary information through media and other contacts. Re-verification of sketchy information through other available sources
2. To do a rapid need assessment of the occurred damage. Organizations choose various methods for Damage Need Assessment (DNA). In upcoming sections this will be dealt in detail
3. The above-mentioned two points provide a fair idea about the quantum and method for immediate relief
4. Search for donor funding and dispatch of pre-positioned, non-perishable items starts. Concept notes and short and detailed proposals are written in parallel to the aforementioned actions
5. Pursuit and negotiations with donors result in availability of cash, in-kind, or both that consolidates the relief operations and transcend immediate relief into medium or long-term rehabilitation
6. Learning and realizations from immediate relief are helpful in formulating rehabilitations, interventions, and methodology

Networking with other organizations, participation in UN sponsored cluster meetings, identification of partners and trainings on Sphere and HAP (latest addition) are few amongst the plethora of ventures that are taken by the intervening organizations to improve the quality of disaster management efforts and to remain transparent with the usage of money that has been received for disaster response. Table 1 shows the amounts of money involved in the last three major humanitarian crises in Pakistan.⁴

4. Table 1 is meant just to give an idea of the amounts involved in disasters and not an effort to establish any relationship between total dollars and spending on Q&A

Table 1: Funding Scenario of Three Latest Disasters Pakistan (2005-2010)

S. No.	Disaster Name	Funding Amount in USD	Unpledged Amount in USD
1.	Earthquake 2005	1,165,554,118	1,037,987,892
2.	KP-IDP Crisis 2009	16,800,000	Not Available
3.	Pakistan Floods-2010	2,196,953,160	415,921,898

Source: Financial Tracking System of OCHA

1.2 International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGOs)

The government sponsored relief activities, though accomplished reactively, are done through National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA).⁵ INGOs, by virtue of their mandate, are a prime channel for funding between northern donors and local implementing organizations. However, it is worth mentioning that the role of INGOs is not limited to fundraising, and in substantial cases, these INGOs also act as implementing bodies.

For implementation without duplication and to economize on available resources, the INGOs working in Pakistan initiated an umbrella body for coordination, networking, and proactive information dissemination by the name of Pakistan Humanitarian Forum (PHF). PHF is the largest in-country network of international nonprofit relief and development NGOs having a long history of working in Pakistan and that offers a broad variety of services to disaster survivors. It was formed in 2003 and currently has membership of forty INGOs, working closely on a wide spectrum of disaster management activities.⁶



Traditionally, the flow of funding is from northern countries to southern part of the world. The flow of logic is: from northern governments and public it comes to either funding channels or southern governments or INGOs/grant making bodies. From there it flows to local IPs and then it goes, mostly, in the form of commodities, to the affected communities. Thus, once the money enters into the south, all parties in this flow become responsible for it and, hence, the accountability. It is important to note that there are one hundred thirty INGOs/NGOs with over four hundred projects in Pakistan's current floods response.⁷

5. For further details please see <http://ndma.gov.pk/aboutNDMA.html>

6. Websites of Oxfam, Care International and Reliefweb

7. <http://www.pakistanfloodresponse.com/organizations>

1.3 Other Stakeholders

In every disaster there is a long list of direct and indirect stakeholders that includes the host communities, the state, the local government, the federal government, back donor governments, national NGOs, INGOs, local institutions, United Nations, institutional donors, political parties, commercial/industrial sector, technical experts, grass-roots organizations, mid-level NGOs, and national and international media.

They all have various roles, but the thin thread that links them directly or indirectly is the utilization of available money for disaster response; beneficiaries are concerned with the quality, quantity, and timely availability of food items (FIs) and nonfood items (NFIs), military apparatus in the logistics, and media with the aspect of management of the disaster.

Few of the above-mentioned stakeholders are also involved at local level fundraising for disaster response. The table gives an idea about the money collected during Floods-2010 by the five provinces in Pakistan; though, due to lack of data, it is difficult to figure out exactly who collected what amount of money, in their respective provinces.

Table 2: Spatial Distribution of Locally Collected Funds for Floods-2010

S. No.	Province wise distribution of collected funds	Amount in Rs
1	Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa	2.2 million (1.96 percent)
2	Gilgit-Baltistan (GB)	4 million (3.57 percent)
3	Balochistan	0.867 million (0.74 percent)
4	Punjab	35.6 million (31.79 percent)
5	Sindh	69.3 million (61.89 percent)
	Total	111.967 million

Source: Six months after: Funds remain unused, survivors still shelterless, The Express Tribune, January 23, 2011

1.4 The Codes, Initiatives, and Standards in the Humanitarian Sector Worldwide

From 1947 to 2010, thirty-two major initiatives were taken to improve the quality, accountability, and learning from good practices in the humanitarian sector. Before 1990, only two codes were initiated while between 1990 and 2010, around thirty ventures were initiated to make humanitarian assistance more accountable. Since the late 1990s, the humanitarian community initiated a number of inter-agency initiatives to improve accountability, quality, and performance in humanitarian action. Four of the most widely known initiatives are the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP), Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP), People in Aid, and the Sphere Project.

The decade of 90s was important as seventeen initiatives were launched, highest in any of the decades since the realization of professionalization of humanitarian work. The table below summarizes the time lines. For a brief introduction to the codes and standards, please see Annexure 4.



Table 3: Year and Number of Codes in Six Decades

S. No.	Year	Number of Codes
1	1947	1
2	1986	1
3	1991	1
4	1992	2
5	1994	4
6	1995	1
7	1997	6
8	1998	1
9	1999	2
10	2000	2
11	2001	2
12	2003	3
13	2004	1
14	2005	4
15	2006	1

Source: As worked out by research team from various sources

1.5 Sphere and HAP in Pakistan

1.5.1 Humanitarian Accountability Partnership

HAP started working in Pakistan in 2008 and it was after the Azad Kashmir Earthquake of 2005, which killed some 75,000 people and left 400,000 homeless.

Due to the earthquake's massive devastation, a great number of humanitarian agencies joined the relief work while those already working in the country increased their existing operations. Perhaps, as a result of the influx of agencies, some concerns were expressed about the quality of community engagement and accountability to beneficiaries. In an effort to address these issues, HAP members asked the HAP Secretariat to establish an operation in Pakistan. The HAP Pakistan program began in October 2005 and closed in July 2009. Although the operation ended in July 2009, HAP's support to agencies in Pakistan continues. HAP is continuing its support to the humanitarian work in Pakistan, particularly the Floods-2010 response.⁸ Currently nine HAP members have headquarters in Pakistan while its other international members are actively involved in the ongoing flood response. In 2009, CWS-P/A took a leadership role in accountability in the region by undertaking an assessment of gaps and further needs regarding accountability in the humanitarian response in Pakistan. The assessment was carried out through meetings and consultations with HAP members and other organizations.

8. The write-up is taken from <http://www.hapinternational.org>, with few modifications only

1.5.2 Sphere in Pakistan⁹

The Sphere Project is being hosted in Pakistan since 2005 Earthquake by CWS-P/A with financial support from Dan Church Aid (DCA), Christian Aid (CA-UK), Caritas Australia (CA), and Act for Peace.

During the process from rehabilitation to development after the 2005 Earthquake, Pakistan faced another disaster, floods in 2007. During and after this crisis, CWS-P/A and the Sphere focal point continue to emphasize the importance and effectiveness of the Sphere Standards. Simultaneously, the strength of the Sphere Standards with regard to disaster preparedness and development is being regularly incorporated in humanitarian response to these crises.

The 2007 phase of the Sphere focal point initiative includes the continuation of activities such as training, representation, technical support, advocacy, and the design of tools. Additionally, the new phase incorporates an interagency Sphere review, externally assisted self-evaluation, and follow-up to previous and current trainings.

HAP and Sphere Project jointly held a seminar, 'Quality and Accountability, from Earthquake to Floods: Have humanitarian interventions become more accountable and of better standard?', on October 30, 2007 in Islamabad, Pakistan. The objective of the seminar was to assess and evaluate the humanitarian interventions that took place during the two large-scale, natural disasters in Pakistan - the earthquake of October 8, 2005 and the floods in 2007 in South Pakistan.

1.6 Floods-2010

Monsoons are a regular feature of Pakistan's predominantly agrarian society. In 1973, more than three million houses were destroyed by floods; in 1976, floods demolished over ten million houses; in 1998, floods resulted in property damage of seventeen billion rupees and, in 1992, fifty billion rupees.¹⁰ The official death toll in the 2001 floods was two hundred ten, and in 2003, it was two hundred thirty. In the last twenty-eight years, Pakistan had fifty flood incidents – an average of 1.72 per year – in which 136.48 persons, on an average, were killed per event.

In July 2010, heavy monsoon rains in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh, Punjab and Balochistan regions of Pakistan badly affected the Indus River basin. At one point, approximately one-fifth of Pakistan's total land area was underwater. According to Government of Pakistan's data, the floods directly affected about twenty million people, mostly by destruction of property, livelihood, and infrastructure, with a death toll of close to 2,000. The number of individuals affected by the flooding exceeds the combined total of individuals affected by the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, the 2005 Kashmir Earthquake, and the 2010 Haiti Earthquake.

9. The write-up is taken from <http://www.sphereproject.org>, with few modifications only

10. *The Dance of Death* By Mansoor Raza, *The Daily Dawn*, Wednesday, 18 Aug, 2010

Table 4: Damage and Losses by Floods–2010

Typology of Losses	Numbers
Deaths	1,985
Injured	2,946
Households damaged	1,744,471
Population affected	20,184,550
Cropped areas (Hectares)	2,244,644
Districts affected	78

Source: NDMA website at <http://ndma.gov.pk/>

Besides, Floods–2010 caused a loss of 365 billion rupees to environmental and natural resources. As per the World Bank Strategic Environmental Program, USD 43 billion is the estimated amount of economic losses inflicted by the recent floods in the country. Food inflation rose to 21.24 percent in September 2010 over the same period of last year on account of steep increases in the prices of perishable items following the floods. Around thirty-three percent of the flood-affected people of the country suffer from psychological trauma. Seventy percent of the roads and bridges in the flooded areas washed away. Floods made a substantial dent in Pakistan’s trade, and it was predicted a couple of months back that USD 1.6 billion would be the trade deficit, as exports are expected to shrink (as per assessment released by the International Monetary Fund). UN claimed that five to six percent of all schools have been damaged by floods, and the damaged school figure crosses 10,000. Six million children were affected. A total of 5.3 million jobs were affected by the worst ever floods in the history of Pakistan (as per estimates of International Labour Organization).¹¹ On November 24, 2010, the then Minister of State for Finance, Hina Rabbani Khar, reported to the Senate the country’s net losses from the recent floods at a colossal USD 10 billion. “The losses have stunted the entire national economy,” the state minister told the Senate.¹²

In early August 2011, the enormity of the disaster attracted the attention of the international community that came to the rescue the survivors but with apprehensions on the utilization of money provided by various actors. United States Coordinator for Economic and Development Assistance, Robin Raphel, raised a set of questions while speaking at a symposium on the role of donors in meeting development challenges in post-flood Pakistan. “There is a long-standing concern over corruption, and all the donors want to ensure transparency.”¹³ Concerns were also raised by other stakeholders over the utilization of incoming funds. Annexure 6 lists a few of the news items that appeared in print media in the first four months of the Floods–2010, highlighting the same issues.

11. Compiled from various media reports from July 2010 to October 2010

12. <http://tribune.com.pk/story/76100/floods-caused-a-net-loss-of-10b-minister/>

13. <http://tribune.com.pk/story/59782/donors-need-assurance-of-transparency-before-giving-out-billions/>

1.7 The Research Project

It is widely established that observance of Quality and Accountability (Q&A) principles enhances the effectiveness of humanitarian action (including response to any disaster). Hence, studying the level of observance of Q&A (or lack of it) is more than an academic pursuit – it is useful in improving effective disaster response programming for future interventions.

While there are several Q&A principles and standards (some of which are complementary), this study uses the Sphere Project and HAP as a point of reference. Both Sphere and HAP are arguably the most well-known and widely recognized initiatives worldwide. The objective of the research is to explore the observance of Q&A principles in Pakistan's humanitarian sector with regards to Floods-2010. It will figure out: a) the understanding of the selected organizations on those standards/principles; b) the mechanisms for implementation of those standards/principles; c) the mechanisms to ensure that whatever was planned is followed; d) the flexibility, causes, and learning; as both Sphere and HAP tools are dynamic entities; and most importantly e) the perception of the communities about the Q&A principles. Documentation of community perception is deemed important as all the disaster management approaches and the money provided are survivors-centric.



1.8 KEY POINTS

The preceding narrative is an attempt to succinctly bring forward the milieu that enshrines the working of the humanitarian sector in Pakistan. As the broader picture provides clues about the details, the narrative acquires immense importance as one embarks on the journey of delving deep into the notions of quality and accountability. The aforementioned subsections are summarized as follows:

1. The disaster history of Pakistan is blemished with catastrophes, and floods are one of the disasters that frequented Pakistan the most. The disasters' patterns have a strong connection with the geography of the country.
2. The onslaught of a disaster galvanizes relief providers and stirs a series of actions for immediate relief, early recovery, and rehabilitation. Besides other actors, INGOs play a vital role in the entire process of disaster management.
3. In operational terms, it is the concern about the efficacious use of money that brings all the actors together.
4. The notions of quality and accountability are informed by various standards and codes, with Sphere and HAP being the most important ones.
5. The scale of Floods-2010 was unprecedented. The enormity of the disaster attracted the international community's attention, which came to rescue the situation by providing funds through various channels.
6. The utilization of the money raised vocal concerns. The issue of transparency was highlighted in national media quite often.
7. This research project was conceived by CWS-P/A to probe into the understanding of notions of quality and accountability at various tiers of disaster management by considering Floods-2010 as its case of reference.



SECTION – TWO

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

2.0 Introduction

As mentioned in the previous sections, the research methodology was developed by the research team in consultation with SHA at CWS-P/A and was guided by a quick review of literature on Q&A principles in the humanitarian sector.¹⁴ While there are several Q&A initiatives – all of which share the common goal of improving accountability, quality, and performance in humanitarian action – they have distinct mandates, constituencies, and structures.¹⁵ This study used the Sphere Project’s *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response* (commonly known as ‘Sphere Handbook’)¹⁶ and HAP¹⁷ as a point of reference to focus on broad Q&A principles.

2.1 Key Research Questions

Based on its overall objective, the research was designed around the following two key research questions:

1. What is the level of observance of Q&A principles in the post-flood response by the humanitarian sector in Pakistan?
2. What are the factors that enable (or discourage) observance of Q&A principles in the humanitarian sector in Pakistan?

The level of observance has been probed to examine the state of Q&A practice in Pakistan. Since practice is contingent on awareness and knowledge of Q&A principles, the study used the latter as a starting point and looked into organizational capacities specific to Q&A. This included organizational certification and membership and staff training in various Q&A initiatives. Furthermore, the study looked into necessary systems and procedures laid out to meet Q&A principles.

The study also attempted to explore the factors that enable (or discourage) observance of Q&A principles to see if there was a positive correlation between various functions of organizational capacity and disaster response with observance of Q&A principles. The standard caveat that ‘correlation does not imply causation’ was, however, the guiding principle. The research also looked into transmission of Q&A narrative along the donor-INGO-NGO-beneficiary chain.

As mentioned above, the Q&A principles were drawn from the Sphere Project and HAP. Both Sphere and HAP are arguably the most well-known and widely recognized Q&A initiatives worldwide.

The Sphere Project defines minimum standards and key indicators for technical areas such as water supply, sanitation and hygiene promotion, and food security, nutrition and food aid, etc. and also provides a set of common standards (and indicators thereof) that relate to all technical areas. These common standards are not only integral to technical areas but are also overarching in nature. The same pertains to participation, initial assessment, response, targeting, monitoring, evaluation, staff competence, and supervision/management. HAP 2007 devised performance benchmarks (and respective requirements and means of verification) that address humanitarian quality management, transparency, beneficiary participation, staff competencies, complaints handling, and

14. Discussions with HAP secretariat also informed the research project

15. An overview of eight leading initiatives is given in Sphere (2009).

16. Sphere Project (2004)

17. HAP International (2007) and HAP International (2008)

continual improvement. Since an overlap and commonality between Sphere’s common standards and HAP’s performance benchmarks exists, this study used the following analytical categories to cover both initiatives.

Table 5: Components of Q&A Principles

	HAP 2007	Sphere 2004
Initial Assessment	B1*	CS2
Response & Targeting		CS3 and CS4
Monitoring and Supervision		CS5 and CS8
Beneficiary Participation and Transparency	B3 and B2	CS1
Staff Competencies and Responsibilities	B4	CS7
Complaints Handling	B5	-
Continual Improvement and Evaluation	B6	CS6

* Benchmark 1 (humanitarian quality management system), inter alia, covers initial assessment, response, targeting, monitoring, and supervision.

2.2 Approach

The research was exploratory in the sense that it aimed to learn how things worked, without formulating any hypothesis. The research was, therefore, not evaluative in nature. The research design used a two-pronged approach to answer key research questions. One part of the research was quantitative and qualitative profiling of Q&A capacities to present an overview of Q&A practices in the humanitarian sector in Pakistan. The other part was a qualitative study of selected field organizations and beneficiaries in four field locations – two each in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh – to present a rich and in-depth picture of Q&A observance on the ground.

2.3 Respondents and Research Tools

The research team identified the following four categories of respondents to elicit and triangulate responses to the above mentioned key questions: a) organizations with significant and verifiable Q&A capacities; b) organizations with little or no prior Q&A capacities; c) beneficiaries; and d) disaster response experts.

The research, although primarily qualitative, used mixed methods to develop an evidence-based narrative to answer key research questions. The primary tool was, however, semi-structured interviews of selected respondents in all categories. Other tools included secondary data review and a quantitative survey of organizations with significant and verifiable Q&A capacities. Research tools used for all four respondents were as follows:

1. Organizations with significant and verifiable Q&A capacities: This category included organizations (INGOs in Pakistan, and national and local NGOs) that have received certification and/or training in one or more Q&A initiatives and have systems and

procedures in place for observing Q&A principles. Following research tools were used for this category:

- a. A comprehensive list of organizations with Q&A capacities was developed using multiple sources (e.g. Sphere focal point, HAP Annual Report, etc.).
 - b. Secondary data review using annual reports, sit-reps, websites, etc. was carried out
 - c. A structured questionnaire (see Annex 2.1) was e-mailed to forty organizations in this category to collect information on Q&A capacities (including human and financial resources). Despite, multiple follow-up calls and e-mails, the research team managed to obtain filled questionnaires from only twelve organizations.
 - d. Semi-structured interviews (see Annex 2.2A) with staff responsible for Q&A: the selection of organizations was done with the help of CWS-P/A staff and key informants to target a mix of INGOs and national and local NGOs with varying degrees of capacities.
 - e. A focus group discussion with thirty-five activists, field workers, and representatives of local and national NGOs to share key findings of the research and to seek their opinion.
 - f. A discussion was facilitated with the members of Accountability and Learning Working Group (ALWG)¹⁸ to stock-take their opinions about the challenges and the way forward on Q&A.
2. Organizations with little or no prior Q&A capacities: This category catered to national and local NGOs that provide humanitarian relief either as an intermediary body or as a field-level implementing agency and have not had exposure to Q&A initiatives. It must be noted that the organizations in this category might have certain Q&A practices independent of formal certification and training in this area. The selection of organizations was done with the help of CWS-P/A staff and key informants. The main research tool was semi-structured interviews with the staff of implementing partners (see Annex 2.2B). Additionally, reports provided by these organizations were also consulted.
 3. Beneficiaries, the people affected by the disaster and recipient of aid, are the most important stakeholder in any disaster response. As the research team strongly believed that all Q&A principles should reflect the field level where the beneficiaries were located, this research placed a greater primacy to beneficiaries' point of view. As many as fifty beneficiaries were interviewed using the checklists for semi-structured interviews (see Annex 2.2C).
 4. The opinion of two international Disaster Response Experts were sought to enrich discussion on observance of Q&A principles (see Annex 2.2D). Additionally, an email questionnaire was sent to ninety-five professionals associated with the humanitarian sector in Pakistan to seek their views on challenges, constraints, and possible solutions (see Annex 2.2E).

2.4 Selection of Field Locations for Interviews with Beneficiaries

Fieldwork was carried out in Kohistan and Swat in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Dadu and Khairpur in Sindh. Additionally, Nowshehra was visited for scoping before the detailed fieldwork started. Earlier a total of six districts – two each in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, and Sindh – were short listed for fieldwork on the basis of flood impact data available on the websites of national and

18. *The overall aim of the forum is to be a resource to strengthen the quality and accountability in flood response. The focus for the first four months of the ALWG will be, but not limited to, the promotion of the information provision, participation, and setting up complaint mechanisms. For further details please see: <http://www.hapinternational.org/pool/files/accountability-working-group-pakistan-tor-november-24th.pdf>*

provincial disaster management authorities. The final selection was made by the research team, keeping in mind logistics, time frame, and security concerns. A focus group discussion was conducted in Hyderabad in which thirty-five activists, field workers, and representatives of local and national NGOs participated.

2.5 Constraints and Challenges

During the course of research, the research team came across numerous issues that were not envisaged in the beginning. The list (though not comprehensive) is as follows:

1. There is a dearth in Pakistan – specific secondary material on the issues that are related to Q&A. Though there is substantial material on experience drawn from other countries, the existing material is devoid of dilemmas that relate to the humanitarian sector of Pakistan.
2. Due to the enormity of Floods-2010, access to some areas proved to be difficult. The research team selected alternate field sites in consultation with key informants.
3. The ever worsening law and order situation in Karachi often resulted in postponement of earlier set meetings. At times, it made planning difficult.
4. The unavailability of staff for long year-end and Christmas holidays resulted in delay of the response on the questionnaire that was sent earlier. It is essential to mention here that every resource was deployed to get the filled and complete questionnaire back.
5. The shyness to share financial information on Q&A such as budget head/line item resulted in sketchy information. The lack of clarity on the relevant budget heads and line items also resulted in the same.
6. The ongoing but slow response to Floods-2010 had repercussions on the research itself. In some places, meetings with beneficiaries were converted into complaint sessions.
7. Intense follow-up was done to gather response on questionnaires and e-mail queries, resulting in delay of earlier set time lines.



2.6 KEY POINTS

The aforementioned subsections are summarized as follows:

1. The study used HAP benchmarks and Sphere common standards to focus on broad quality and accountability principles.
2. The research study was exploratory and was designed around the following two key research questions: i) what was the level of observance of Q&A principles, and ii) what were the factors that enabled (or discouraged) observance of Q&A principles.
3. The research was primarily qualitative in which data was collected using semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions from beneficiaries, organizations (with or without significant Q&A capacities), aid workers, and disaster response experts. Additionally, some quantitative information was also collected from humanitarian organizations.
4. Fieldwork was carried out in Kohistan and Swat in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Dadu and Khairpur in Sindh. Additionally, interviews and focus group discussions were conducted in Islamabad and Hyderabad.
5. The research was constrained by a lack of secondary data on the practice of Q&A principles in Pakistan, difficult access to some flood-affected areas, and unavailability of financial data specific to Q&A.



SECTION – THREE

FINDINGS AND
ANALYSIS

3.0 Introduction

This section presents key findings from seven broad components that cover Q&A principles as described in Section 2.1. While each component was treated independently, the narrative is unavoidably interconnected and subsections refer to each other. The findings were drawn from the qualitative fieldwork and interviews with key stakeholders, a quantitative survey of twelve organizations, a focus group discussion, a couple of presentations, and quick literature review.

3.1 Initial Assessment

Initial assessment, one of the common standards in Sphere, is the first step taken in any disaster response. It is also present in HAP as an element of its performance benchmark that deals with humanitarian quality management system.

Besides evidence of painstaking efforts for all-inclusive need assessment in the disaster management phases by the do-gooders, the research team came across instances in which the intent was not served at best. The upcoming few lines are written with full realization that there are a number of factors that hamper an ideal need assessment: inaccessibility of the affected areas, lack of information, dated demographic profiles, and the uncalled for influence of the influential. It is well acknowledged that immaculate systems and procedures are high on the implementation plans of the respective organizations; nevertheless, the translation of those systems in practice is an area that needs further focus.



During the fieldwork, some stakeholders – ranging from beneficiaries to aid providers – pointed out that there were quality, quantity, and coverage gaps between assistance required and provided.¹⁹ This was more visible in the case of non camp beneficiaries than camp beneficiaries. It was found

¹⁹ This finding is similar to the findings of research reports on response to the 2005 Earthquake and 2009 Swat IDPs Crisis. See, for example, Bhatti (2006) and Featherstone (2010) respectively.

that the problem was partially rooted in the way initial assessments – and, in some cases, afterwards in-depth assessments – were carried out. In many places, the enormity of the disaster forced the humanitarian agencies to rely on key informants who were either not oriented in humanitarian principles or they were themselves entrenched in the existing socio-economic structures which are not only patriarchal but also feature social stratification. This was also corroborated by the participants of focus group discussions. There is anecdotal evidence that it resulted in exclusion or under-enumeration of marginalized groups, thus, furthering their marginalization.

Moreover, the views of women and children were often not elicited. There were several explanations presented for the exclusion of women and children. These ranged from the absence of female counterpart in the assessment team to the culturally-accepted practice of interviewing adult males only. In the case of children, a very clear notion of ageism was prevalent among the beneficiaries and some aid providers.

According to some FGD participants, the information collected in initial assessment is sometimes contaminated because those carrying out the exercise rely on their personal opinion and perception. Moreover, some hard-to-reach, far flung affected areas are not visited for some reason which reduces the accuracy of assessment. It was also pointed out that not all the grass-roots organizations have up-to-date information about their area. However, FGD participants were unanimous in emphasizing the importance of local grass-roots organizations over national level NGOs.

In many cases, the initial assessment reports were limited to the number of houses damaged and number of people living in the assessed area. As such there was little vulnerability analysis of the affected population, which would have improved targeting. There was not one single, standard method used by humanitarian agencies to collect information, and the ways and means varied from one agency to the other and from one area to another. The methods, understandably, depended on the capacity of and resources available to humanitarian agencies, and also on the level of disaster. It was found that the following five methods were commonly used:

1. Many international and national organizations sent humanitarian aid workers to assess the situation at ground level. The team worked with local activists and key informants who belonged to affected areas.
2. Local CBOs and NGOs collected information – sometimes systematically

Box 3.1: Important observations from the field

Besides the issues as discussed in upcoming sections, the research team extracted the following talking points from the field. These are open for further debate as these are mere observations and not conclusions:

1. *There is a difference in response of short-term project staff who know that their stakes are limited and of the long-term staff towards Q&A. However, it was argued that long-term staff usually receive all types of training, whether relevant to them or not, so they develop immunity to learning. It was also brought into focus that long-term staff tends to develop cordial relationships with all relevant people and that includes suppliers and with the staff of the donors as well, which can create obstacles in Q&A observance.*
2. *The insecurity of IDPs, in camps, forces them to defeat the organized system of relief distribution. Uncertainty about the unavailability of relief goods particularly*

and, at times, on ad hoc basis – and prepared lists which were later shared with international and national organizations.

3. Local activists and NGO workers teamed up on their own to prepare a list of damaged houses and affected population.
4. Government officials relied on the revenue department staff at the *patwar* (a revenue collection unit at local level) level which is supposed to have sufficient knowledge about the population in their area.
5. Some organizations used projected population estimates – albeit with mixed success – based on the 1998 census data.

It must be noted that in most of the cases the above mentioned methods were applied exclusively, but in a few cases, they were used in combination with one or more of the above mentioned methods.

The quantitative survey showed that all twelve organizations surveyed carried out assessment exercise after Floods-2010 (see Annex 3). While ten out of twelve organizations followed Sphere standards, only five had a humanitarian quality management system in place as prescribed by HAP.

There were a couple of places where the affected claimed that their area was assessed by national-level organizations who prepared lists of households affected, and yet, they did not receive any aid as there was no follow-up response. It was found that such cases were few and far between. Nevertheless, an assessment exercise creates hope, and if there is no subsequent response, then it may result in a trust deficit with humanitarian actors.

As mentioned earlier, the situation in formal and managed camps was different. The

food items forces them to obtain more and more food from other sources, beside the availability in camps, and store them in their respective tents.

3. *There are several existing management standards that are quite helpful in Q&A promotion, since these serve as a foundation upon which to build Q&A.*
4. *To bring profundity to the concepts of Q&A demands time for reflection. The nature of disaster management is quite task driven and too hard pressed against time. Hence, institutional mechanisms are required to promote culture of reflection: to add value to the recorded observations.*
5. *For complainant gradual and graduating complaint-redress hierarchy is not very appealing. There is a cultural tendency to approach the big boss directly.*
6. *The privacy of the complainant is a key factor in complaint mechanism. Quality of the complaint depends on the privacy issue as well. On the other hand, accountability of complainant is equally important to mitigate the abuse of complaint-redress systems*
7. *Verbal complaints with a personal touch takes precedence over written complaints. The culture of writing is prevalent in government organizations and corporate sector; the former is detested for its inefficiency and corruption and the latter has yet to take its roots in the rural hinterland.*
8. *During immediate relief, the closer the distribution points are to the affected areas, the more efficacious complaint handling mechanism is. The longer the distance between the two, delay will be observed*

very nature of a camp made it possible to enumerate each and every person who had found temporary shelter there. Almost all managed camps followed the standard procedure of camp registration and were equipped with age and gender disaggregated data. In many camps, education and health status of camp residents was also captured. This helped the camp managers to respond to the specific needs of, for example, children of school going age and pregnant women.

However, it is encouraging to note that later assessments are relatively detailed ones and tried to cover the gaps of initial assessments. Diminution of disasters initial days' pressure to respond results in more thoughtful endeavours for damage need assessments.

3.2 Response and Targeting

Response and targeting are two common standards in Sphere. Both are also present in HAP as an element of its performance benchmark that deals with humanitarian quality management system.

It can be argued that the effectiveness of an agency's response and appropriateness of its targeting largely depend upon the quality of initial assessment, its capacity, and available resources. As mentioned earlier, concerns – and complaints – about the response were highlighted by respondents in the fieldwork, as well as by FGD participants. There were issues about the quality of relief goods provided and also about the geographical coverage. Some respondents claimed that exclusion and inclusion errors were not uncommon.

The previous section discussed that the problem was partly due to the way initial assessments were conducted. The fieldwork, interviews, and FGD with aid providers also highlighted some structural issues that are intrinsically linked with the practice

in complaint handling mechanism as it involves increased logistics, resources, and time.

9. *The changing emphasis of donors from one standard to another is causing a bit of irritation. Sometimes, it is referred to as khana puri (for the sake-of-it activity).*
10. *The external influences and the corruption at the macro level are creating problems in cultivation of values in the organizations at the micro level. Hence, any evaluation of observance of Q&A principles should be observed in totality and keeping the local realities in view.*
11. *Maintaining of website by the organizations and putting up-to-date information is emerging as key indicator of accountability.*
12. *The development of systems by support institutions like SOPs, provision of software, regular audits, and internal controls helps in developing accountability standards other than Sphere and HAP. Hence, an organization may not be HAP certified but it may have other systems to ensure transparency.*
13. *The phenomenon of Q&A is holistic. It heavily relates to the value system of the organization and is embedded in the entire phenomenon of organizational development. It cannot be implemented in quality fashion if practiced in isolation.*
14. *HAP is less heard of in contrast to Sphere, and it is because of the latter's historic presence. However, HAP is perceived to be more user-friendly as compared to its companion, Sphere.*
15. *Organizations and people who have worked hands on in major disasters are more interested in Q&A.*

of humanitarianism in Pakistan. Many international agencies increase outreach and limit genuine security risks by working with local level organizations. In such cases, there is a great danger that the relationship may reduce to mere client-vendor status. It was also pointed out that the onus of defining the relationship lies on donors, and its metamorphosis depends on the availability of



the space given to partners for candid feedback and honest sharing. Not surprisingly, such relationships are temporal and transaction based. The emphasis is, thus, on meeting targets and deadlines – which are, of course, worthy objectives in their own – sometimes without an explicit belief in humanitarian principles and often without necessary training and understanding of humanitarian practice. The issue of NGOs giving more importance to meeting targets – over ensuring quality – was also raised by FGD participants.

Having mentioned that, the importance of partnering with local organizations and actors cannot be overstated. Achieving presence on the ground directly or through local organizations is a vital component of successful relief operations. The cause of humanitarianism can only increase when meaningful partnerships are developed at all tiers. This may require extensive handholding and intensive capacity building of local partners in disaster risk reduction and during the relief phase. Some FGD participants were of the opinion that in addition to strong vertical partnerships at various levels, aid providers should have put in more efforts in horizontal coordination and networking.

16. *The subscription to Q&A may have an ad hoc and unplanned start. A lot happened to address immediate requirements and secure money but later helped in internalization of the Q&A concepts. How far an organization goes to embrace those standards depends largely on its value system.*

17. *It is not always the urgency of a situation that results in exoneration from principles and standards. In case of huge emergencies, lack of resources also compels organizations to unwillingly resort to exonerations.*

18. *Working in disasters usually enhances the capacity of disaster managers, even if they were not previously trained. The resulting, enhanced capacity (learning by doing, lingo, etc) could be consolidated through post disasters training and awareness raising sessions.*

19. *In multiparty camp management, accountability is a tricky question in terms of who has the final responsibility for the overall management.*

20. *Community relies on its intuition for making complaints and on whom to trust and whom not to trust.*

21. *Q&A could be made part of DRR; however, the enormity of a disaster can undo DRR strategies.*

Another issue that came up related to one-size-fits-all approach in relief. It is standard practice to provide ready-to-eat food during the first few days, which is replaced by uncooked food items when the situation improves. During the fieldwork, the respondents complained of the quality of food items provided to the affected population. Additionally, the FGD participants pointed out that there were inadequate arrangements of food for infants. It was found that the type of wheat flour preferred by people in Kohistan and Swat was not provided to them, even after repeated complaints in the third month of the relief phase. Since it is easier to manage, the procurement process in many organizations is on the basis of a purchase commitment mechanism with a reliable vendor. It appeared that either the complaint mechanism did not work well or the aid providers had little control over the supply chain.²⁰

As mentioned in the previous section, exclusion on the basis of social structures was reported in some places. This has clear implications for targeting. For example, the *Gujars* in Kohistan, who primarily work as tenant farmers on the land of local landlords, complained of discrimination in relief provision. Similarly, there were reports of exclusion and discrimination of the *Kasabgars* in Swat and scheduled-caste Hindus in Khairpur and Jamshoro. However, further probing reveals that there is an increased realization among workers about the shortfall and that various measures are practiced to minimize the seclusion. One of the respondents mentioned that by conducting a meeting for initial assessments and response and targeting at a public place, instead of space provided by some heavy-weight of the area, causes more inclusive turnout of the community.

For various political, economical reasons and demographic reasons – the debate on which are not in scope of this report – polarization on the basis of religion has infested large segments of Pakistani society, which has its implications on target and response. The interviews and media reports²¹ confirmed that discrimination in the days of distribution was prevalent. Hindu minorities and Ahmedis suffered the most from that unwarranted attitude on the part of aid providers.

As was expected, camp beneficiaries were less critical of the response provided to them, compared to non camp beneficiaries. By and large, all people registered in camps were found to have equal privileges, though there was overcrowding in some camps which caused several problems. The most visible problem was the shortage of latrines, as the camps were designed for fewer people. In some places, camp residents complained about the provision of uncooked food items on an irregular basis. In the third month of the flood response, it was found that the camp management in many places was planning to close camps. On the other hand, the camp residents were found to be reluctant to return to their homes as they were of the opinion that the situation had not improved in their area. This was the case with two camps in Dadu that were managed by an NGO and the district government, respectively.

According to FGD participants, the process of registration of those who made camps their temporary abode was pivotal in planning and managing response. By and large, the registration process improved the effectiveness of response, barring cases where some unaffected people also managed to get themselves registered. It was pointed out that the population of non camp residents was

20. *Using the case studies of the South African food crisis in 2002 and the Gujarat 2001 Earthquake, Wassenhove (2006) has emphasized on being 'better prepared' for effective disaster logistics. The domain of preparedness, as outlined by Wassenhove, covers human resources, knowledge management, operations and process management, financial resources, and the community.*

21. *For further details please see media reports in the annexure 5*

greater than that of the camp residents, and the former could have been better serviced with some sort of improvised registration mechanism. The location of camps, in some cases, was problematic as they were located outside cities, and there were inadequate facilities for the camp residents. Some FGD participants also criticized the way food and nonfood items were distributed. According to them, the dignity of affected population was hurt.

While the twelve organizations that were surveyed had played some role in the flood response, only seven claimed that they had used Sphere standards in their work to ensure quality and accountability.

3.3 Complaints Handling

Complaints handling features prominently in HAP as a performance benchmark. While it is not explicitly mentioned in Sphere 2004, the forthcoming edition of Sphere includes complaints and redress as part of a core standard entitled “People-centered humanitarian response”.

Setting up complaints handling procedures that respond to beneficiaries’ grievances to their satisfaction is considered to be an effective way of being accountable. It also increases beneficiary participation by encouraging them to provide feedback for improvement. It was found that aid organizations established different types of complaints handling mechanisms to varying degrees of success. One of the most basic methods was displaying telephonic and e-mail contact details of aid providers at the distribution point as well as on the packets containing food and nonfood items. Additionally, at some places announcements were also made to let people know that they could contact supervisory and management staff in case of any complaints. During the field visits, interviews, and FGD with aid providers, an emphasis on establishing complaint boxes was noticed. These boxes were supposed to be placed at convenient locations for beneficiaries and were set to be unlocked by designated staff. In some places, there was a lack of clarity as to who would handle the complaints box, what the frequency of opening the box would be, and how the complaints would be processed. This ambiguity was also pointed out by FGD participants.

It was found that the aid providers, especially at the field level, received a large number of complaints. Very few complaints were, however, made in writing (either on paper or through electronic mail). The most common form was verbal complaints conveyed through telephone calls or delivered face-to-face. In interviews with aid providers, the ratio between written and verbal complaints emerged to range from 20:80 to 30:70. The primacy of verbal complaints was also established by the general agreement between aid workers that verbal complaints preceded written complaints. It was revealed that the tendency among aid workers was more to pacify the complainants by assuring them of grievance redress. It also emerged that there were fewer instances in which verbal complaints were documented and forwarded to the supervisory and management staff. It was argued that many complaints were unfounded and exaggerated, and some were based on incorrect information or perception about the relief process. The FGD participants stressed that there were cases in which beneficiaries misled the media, visiting donor representatives, and influential persons. Nevertheless, as a matter of principle all complaints should be taken seriously, looked into carefully, and communicated properly to all concerned so that beneficiaries have greater trust in humanitarianism. Secondly, the importance of transparency and beneficiary participation demands that the complainants should receive a timely response even if the demands are unjust.

Various explanations for fewer written complaints were put forward by respondents that included beneficiaries and aid providers. The foremost is the dominance of oral culture in Pakistani society in which people tend to verbally discuss rather than put things in writing. This is also compounded by illiteracy, which is higher in rural areas. An interesting explanation related to the instant nature of verbal complaint, in which the complainant usually gets an immediate – favourable or otherwise – reply. This is not the case with written complaints which are often processed to the degree of red-tapism. Another competing argument is that the flood affected people were generally hesitant in lodging formal complaints as they were fearful of repercussions or generally felt helpless in their misery. If this is the case, then the humanitarian sector needs to do more to act and look humane.

A useful finding is that there is awareness among the aid providers that the complaints handling system needs to be established in a way that enables beneficiaries to lodge complaints and receive satisfactory response. Another encouraging factor is the increased acceptance of the right of the community to provide feedback to the implementing agency.

3.4 Beneficiary Participation and Transparency

Beneficiary participation features prominently in both Sphere and HAP (Benchmark 3). Additionally, HAP makes it mandatory for aid providers to be more transparent by providing information (Benchmark 2).

As mentioned earlier, it was found that initial assessment and first few days of response had limited beneficiary participation. Keeping in mind the severity of disaster, it is quite understandable. However, little or no beneficiary participation in the third month of flood response is not only undesirable but also objectionable. While many aid workers claimed that they practiced participatory decision making, some were forthcoming that the process is often limited to information sharing with beneficiaries about their projects. It is not practiced while formulating the package for the intended users. However, it was put forward that long-term presence of organizations (as manifested in the mandate of many national NGOs) helped in informed actions about survivors' preferences. This was also corroborated by the accounts given by respondents in the fieldwork. As pointed out by FGD participants, many organizations work as contractors²² (due to obligations of institutional survival) to implement assigned projects in one or more thematic areas. In such cases, participation cannot change their product offering, but it can surely help improve targeting and delivery.

At many places, beneficiaries got together and formed local level committees that facilitated the visiting assessment teams and also interacted with them during the implementation. It was felt that existing, pre-flood community organizations were better placed in working with aid organizations. However, several newly-formed community organizations also helped their communities through coordination on a voluntary basis. In many formal camps, committees were also formed to help the camp management in managing day-to-day issues. There were cases in which the role of camp committees was found to be nominal.

There are no two thoughts that the intervening organizations are transparent to an appreciable extent. How much they communicate to the beneficiaries about the mechanisms of transparency, however, needs attention as community perception about transparency is a key building block of managing transparency.

22. *The role of NGOs as contractors has been discussed in detail in Smillie (1996), Sobhan (1997), and Williams (2003).*

It seems that, by and large, a lack of clarity about the desirable level of transparency in the humanitarian sector in Pakistan exists. While organizations were found to be sending regular financial and progress reports to their national or international donors (or to their head offices in Islamabad or abroad), there is little willingness in extending the information chain to local level organizations or to beneficiaries. A couple of respondents referred to this phenomenon as selective transparency. One of the respondents pointed out the fact that the implementing organizations cannot share the entire budget with the community as it contains line items for admin and operational expenses of the organizations including salaries of the personnel- which are in sharp contrast with average per capita income in Pakistan.

3.5 Staff Competencies and Responsibilities

“Aid Worker Competencies and Responsibilities” is one of the common standards in Sphere and a performance benchmark of HAP.

The scale of disaster in question was so enormous that an appropriate response demanded aid workers in great number. While there were experienced aid workers already working in the humanitarian sector who took the lead, there was, nevertheless, a significant shortfall. Almost all organizations increased their human resource by hiring new staff. In some organizations, the novice aid workers were given briefings on the work assigned to them. It was also reported that some organizations arranged short orientation or training sessions on humanitarian principles and quality and accountability standards. As rightly pointed out by FGD participants, this process helped increase the quantity and quality of human resource related to the humanitarian sector.

A survey of twelve organizations revealed that there was an almost two-fold increase in staff during the flood relief phase (see Annex 3). Staff responsible for Q&A, mainly housed in the monitoring and evaluation unit, also increased by the same ratio. However, the increase in staff formally trained in Sphere and HAP ranged from thirty-three to thirty-seven percent.

An important issue raised by interviewed organizations was that of staff retention during any disaster response.²³ It was said that when organizations invest in staff training, they expect their staff to remain with the agency. It was claimed that job switching during emergency and relief phases, especially of the experienced mid-level staff, was not uncommon. This practice is detrimental to the cause of humanitarianism as one organization’s gain is at the cost of another’s loss. This loss is more than just of institutional memory, as high staff turnover increases management time on recruitment and training of newly-inducted staff.

It can be argued that staff competencies on Q&A are best harnessed in the presence of functioning Q&A systems in organizations, as increased staff competencies are necessary – but not sufficient – for effective and efficient humanitarian response. This is especially important for national and local organizations that are more into development projects than disaster response. These organizations may have greater grass-roots presence, but often lack necessary systems and procedures for humanitarian response. There is a tendency of sending staff on training, but the usage of training content is contingent on organizational setup.

23. Richardson (2006) has discussed the impact of skills shortage and staff turnover, and human resourcing models in the first and second stages of emergency.

While the importance of capacity building is absolutely clear to all types of organizations, there is a debate on its financing. While awarding projects, many donors expect the implementing organizations to already have trained staff. As such, very few allow project money to be spent on staff training. Some resort to shortcuts and arrange crash courses and briefing sessions on Q&A principles and initiatives.

There was a general agreement between staff of large, international organizations and small, local level organizations that given there are financial resources available, all staff should receive training on Q&A. This includes program support staff in the accounts and IT departments. Only then will the whole organization be on the same page. It was also pointed out that the attitude of short-term project staff is very different from that of regular, program staff. The latter equips her/himself with relevant skills, and the former remains uncertain about getting a job extension and instead takes the work rather casually due to an uncertain future.

3.6 Monitoring and Supervision

“Monitoring and Supervision” and “Management and Support of Personnel” are two common standards in Sphere. Both are also present in HAP as an element of its performance benchmark that deals with humanitarian quality management system.

It can be asserted that an effective and efficient humanitarian response is a function of organization-wide systems and procedures required for humanitarian response. These systems and procedures are necessary for day-to-day management of operations and for continual improvement. The quantitative survey carried out for this research has shown that nine out of twelve organizations claimed that they follow Sphere standards for monitoring. Additionally, as many as thirty-eight members of the Pakistan Humanitarian Forum are said to have formal, internal audit mechanisms to improve and assure quality.



It was observed, and also highlighted by FGD participants, that in many organizations monitoring systems are donor-centric. Hence, donor-specific data collection templates and reporting systems were found to be prevalent in many national and local organizations. This is partly due to the nature of the relationship between large and grass-roots organizations, in which the power/authority equilibrium is an unrealized dream and hence, translates in varied level of interest in humanitarianism. There are, of course, questions about the role of large organizations who promote this culture and feel that long-term partnership is an expensive and demanding proposition. On the other hand, some large national organizations and INGOs working in Pakistan have similar donor-specific monitoring systems in place. After all, they are also accountable to their donors.

The prevalent monitoring systems were found to be largely quantitative. The focus was on collection and reporting of numbers – X number of beneficiaries received Y number of FIs and NFIs, etc. While numbers are important in decision making and monitoring of progress, they often hide extreme cases in the guise of averages and percentages. It can be argued that the nuances in disaster response need qualitative accounts along with quantitative data. The need of an effective monitoring system was also highlighted by the FGD participants, who stressed that such a system should be designed primarily by and for the organization. Moreover, the monitoring system should not be seen and implemented only to highlight the shortcomings of field staff. Its scope should rather be organization-wide and such a system should help point out areas of improvement – hence a learning process.

3.7 Continual Improvement and Evaluation

“Aid Worker Competencies and Responsibilities” is one of the common standards in Sphere and a performance benchmark of HAP.

The process of continual improvement requires organizational commitment, capacity, and resources. It depends on a monitoring, documentation, and reporting system that reflects upon what works and why. As mentioned in the previous section and agreed by FGD participants, the existing monitoring system found in many organizations often does not go beyond reporting against quantitative targets. Almost all organizations (and donors) ask for narrative reports, but it seems that many organizations have inadequate mechanisms that can help transform staff reflection into learning. There are many anecdotes but few well-documented accounts about responsible innovation. The FGD participants vouched that by and large the humanitarian sector does not produce good documentation. In many cases, it also does not share its learning and experience through publications and websites.

Like earlier responses to disasters, the flood relief has enabled the aid workers and humanitarian sector organizations to learn a thing or two about effective relief operations. What seems to be missing is management commitment – needed to allocate staff time and resources – to consolidate learning once the relief period ends. The humanitarian sector in Pakistan has produced several external, donor-funded evaluation studies, but there are fewer studies on lessons learned. The landscape of the humanitarian sector has changed drastically because of the varied nature and

extent of recent disasters – and response thereof. In this scenario, the concept of a learning organization is more pertinent today than ever.²⁴

It is heartening to note that new tools are being experimented with in order to evaluate an intervention from a gender perspective. A respondent mentioned an example of employing story-based research methods to enquire about gender inequalities in disaster response. The method asks members of an assembly to tell their favorite stories and the facilitator picks up the gender-biased nuances inherent in that particular local culture, in a subtle manner, and articulates his/her finding to the same group for triangulation.

3.8 KEY POINTS

The aforementioned subsections are summarized as follows:

1. There were quality, quantity, and coverage gaps between assistance required and provided. This problem was partially rooted in the way initial assessments (which is the first step taken in any disaster response) were carried out.
2. During initial assessments, the views of women and children were often not elicited. Moreover, there is anecdotal evidence that marginalized groups were often excluded or under-enumerated.
3. Many beneficiaries expressed concerns and complained about the quality of relief goods provided and also about the geographical coverage. Some respondents claimed that exclusion and inclusion errors were not uncommon.
4. The situation in formal and managed camps was significantly better, where everyone was counted and was provided with similar level of response.
5. The important and necessary partnership of international agencies and local organizations was affected by the role of the latter which was seen as that of a contractor interested mainly in meeting quantitative targets.
6. The complaints handling systems in place received very few written complaints, as most of the complainants preferred verbal communication.
7. There is increased awareness among aid providers that the complaints handling system needs to be established in a way that enables beneficiaries to lodge complaints and receive satisfactory responses.
8. At many places, beneficiaries came together and formed local level committees that facilitated the visiting assessment teams and also interacted with them during the implementation. It was felt that existing, pre-flood community organizations were better prepared for working with aid organizations.
9. While organizations were found to be sending regular financial and progress reports to their national or international donors (or to their head offices in Islamabad or abroad), there was little willingness in extending the information chain to local level organizations or to beneficiaries.
10. As the number of skilled and experienced humanitarian sector professionals is limited, staff retention during any disaster response becomes a major issue for organizations.
11. There is a dearth of professionals trained in Q&A principles who work with local-level organizations.
12. The prevalent monitoring systems were found to be largely quantitative which fails to capture the nuances in disaster response.
13. Management commitment is needed to allocate staff time and resources so that organizational learning can be consolidated once the relief period ends.

24. Smith and Young (2009) have identified “systemic tensions that need to be balanced when designing effective learning solutions” in relief organizations. These include financial implications of establishing learning systems and management considerations of keeping low operating costs; and employees’ willingness to reflect and workload.



SECTION – FOUR

CHALLENGES,
CONCLUSIONS, AND
RECOMMENDATIONS

4.0 Challenges

From the previous sections, one may have a fair idea – in a consolidated manner – of the areas that need improvement in the pursuit of Q&A. The second round of interviews (with representatives of local NGOs, mid-level NGOs, INGOs, and members of ALWG) from the FGDs and from the e-mail responses, the researchers were informed of the following challenges. A number of respondents asserted that observance of Q&A principles within an organization is contingent upon that organization’s particular value system. The inference, hence, is the challenge of translating overarching values into procedures and protocols:

1. Staff members of a considerable number of organizations suffer from a lack of knowledge about Q&A values. The bottom line is that this leads to staff anxiety. “Accountability is taken as a great source of worry for development sector workers because of unawareness regarding its usefulness for better service delivery to beneficiaries and controlling the authority with responsibility,” mentioned one of the respondents. Various reasons are cited for the phenomenon which include:
 - Q&A is a relatively newly implemented concept in the development sector
 - Prevalence of various standards for same interventions
 - Staff is not clear as to why to adopt Q&A standards
 - Shortage of training providing institutions on Q&A
 - Lack of will on the part of staff to adopt Q&A and fear of the unknown
 - Confusion/misperception among the staff on the implementation of HAP and Sphere

On the other hand, organizations with sound systems and internal accountability mechanisms do not feel that the promotion and awareness of Q&A is a big deal.

2. Lack of awareness of Q&A vocabulary is a challenge; aid workers often do things that are components of Q&A as part of good programming (for example, introducing project activities and budgets to communities transparently), but they do not put these activities under the umbrella of Q&A. As a result, some aspects of Q&A might be overlooked. Also, the word ‘accountability’ is perceived as value loaded and is often associated with misdemeanors and punitive measures.
3. There is an abundance of standards as pushed by various donors, and to make those convergent for user-friendly implementation is a challenge. Coordination of grant making bodies and implementing agencies, as in other aspects of disaster management, is considered mandatory in Q&A as well.
4. Monitoring, by virtue of its dynamics, is a learning process, but the emphasis on quantitative monitoring eclipses the importance of qualitative monitoring, thus, leaving behind the process and the opportunity to draw lessons from disaster management. The organic personality of Q&A thrives on systematic learning. However, it is also a reality that not enough implementing bodies have the capacity to institutionalize learning and to subsequently incorporate lessons learned in systems and procedures.
5. The commitment of institutional donors toward Q&A and to get it translated into financial support for the same was described as a major challenge. To substantiate the argument, the lack of an UN cluster on Q&A was cited as an example.
6. The macro environment of corruption ridden governance is a challenge as it sets the ethos for not following standards. The silence on these issues by the majority is by virtue of a

- feeling of helplessness rather than tacit approval; nevertheless, the culture of silence and ignoring the malpractices tends to become embedded in the general psyche.
7. A considerable number of complaints lies either in false or in anonymous complaints' category. These result in the wastage of staff time and organizational resources.
 8. It was discussed that in any emergency managing the influence and pressures of influential persons is an uphill task, which affects the quality of response and targeting.
 9. Proper investigation of complaints and particularly those of a serious nature demands ample time by their handlers. It is a challenge to give a quality verdict within a time that is sufficient to keep the expectation of the complainant intact.
 10. Procurement and tendering are considered to be the most difficult terrain for Q&A. It was argued that philosophy of trust, as maintained by a majority of organizations, has the least application here.
 11. It was proposed that making accountability a demand from the supply side is the real challenge (i.e. cultivation of a culture where communities are empowered enough to give prompt feedback to the intervening organization).

4.1 Conclusions

The research was designed to answer two key research questions: about the level of observance of Q&A principles; and factors that enable (or discourage) observance of Q&A principles. Following are the in-escapable conclusions:

1. Initial Assessment is the corner stone of disaster management process and it demands timely and precise data for over all disaster response strategy
2. The process of monitoring is vital in making up of a quality response and effective learning
3. One discouraging factor was the relatively low level of awareness about the importance of Q&A initiatives. Many aid and development workers, who were engaged in disaster response at the grass-roots level, had not heard about specific Q&A initiatives. Their counterparts in head offices in Islamabad and other large cities were more knowledgeable, but organization-wide awareness is needed to further the cause of humanitarianism.
4. With few exceptions, the level of observance of Q&A is low across the myriad actors in the humanitarian sector. While there is varied degree of awareness and knowledge of Q&A principles in the sector, there are issues in practice that were discussed at length in previous sections.
5. In many cases, the promoters of Q&A principles, despite their best efforts and because of genuine reasons, still have a long haul to instill the importance of Q&A principles in the aid chain (INGO-NGO-local organization). Focus on the leadership of organizations to further enhance their capacities by applying known capacity enhancement tools is expected to bear desired results.
6. Q&A principles depend upon the values and ethos of an organization, and there is no shortcut. It is ascertained that the short-term project approach in contrast with long-term program methodology is at play in decreasing the values of humanitarianism in Pakistan.
7. It is not that there was zero compliance with various standards. There were some organizations in which the level of observance of Q&A principles was better than their counterparts. However, it was observed that in many cases it all started on insistence from their respective donors.

8. Some organizations, grudgingly, consider Q&A to be a burdensome and extraneous donors' agenda. Unless the value of Q&A principles is accepted by all concerned, the practice will not improve.
9. One of the encouraging factors that emerged during fieldwork was that some organizations are showing a potential to be a role model, and it will take some time for the potential to be realized to its maximum.
10. The flag carriers will have to be more transparent and accountable if they would like Q&A to gain more ground.

4.2 Recommendations

The preceding sections give a clear overview of the prevailing level of the observance of Q&A principles by some key stakeholders of the humanitarian sector in Pakistan. The research proposes the following actions to strengthen the Q&A paradigm of the relevant actors:

1. All inclusive approach in coordination with actors of disaster management field needs to be adopted for better need and initial assessments. To include Q&A officers from the very beginning of the disaster response action and incorporating their feedback in the action-design is bound to pay dividends.
2. Non-disaster periods should be utilized to consolidate learning and for making Q&A more contextual through reflections. Extractions from monitoring visits and reports should be utilized more for the purpose. Besides internal learning process, efforts should be made for sharing learned lessons in wider groups. This research could be a start leading to new research avenues and documentation of initiatives, case studies, good practices, etc.
3. Extensive handholding and capacity building of implementing organizations before disasters through training, provision of literature, exposure visits, and staff exchange programs is deemed necessary.
4. The low literacy levels (though in absolute numbers it is increasing), requires pictorial representation of key messages on Q&A. The availability of relevant material in regional and local languages would enhance Q&A-literacy efforts.
5. Long-term affordable training/certification program for individuals in disaster management with focus on Q&A principles should be devised to increase the quantity and quality of human resource in the humanitarian sector.
6. Intense lobbying needs to be done with donors for the availability of technical and financial resources for Q&A. Establishing a UN cluster on Q&A would be the first step to convince institutional and back donors about the worth of Q&A in the aid management progression. Preaching alone will not be very helpful. Organizations are required to demonstrate through their systems, policies, practices, and procedures that despite all odds Q&A standards are doable and achievable targets.
7. Q&A should be made an integral part of DRR for effective response and improved Q&A observance in immediate relief. Without unambiguous financial support neither DRR nor Q&A would be of any significance in disaster management undertaking.
8. Understanding and devising ways to implement Q&A concepts could be a part of capacity building/OD programs for organizations to improve systems and procedures needs. The research also proposes extensive lobbying with the existing HRD institutions to include HAP/Sphere in training contents for various trainings. Similarly, existing M&E units of

- organizations need to be strengthened further. This can only be achieved through the vivid demonstration of commitment to Q&A by people in the top echelons of the organizations.
9. Since an increasing number of organizations are taking interest in the Q&A concepts, it is essential to make an umbrella coordinating group for the purpose of sharing learning, increasing outreach, and contextualizing the paradigm. ALWG is a starting point and needs to have a progressive continuity, to district level.
 10. Mid-level local NGOs and SIs that have direct communication with communities could pay large dividends in a short span of time. They should receive training and every possible support for human resource development in their respective organizations and at the community level.
 11. It is recommended that hasty implementation of complaints' handling mechanisms will not be efficacious. Thorough consultation with beneficiaries should take place before a contextualized and all inclusive complaints' handling mechanism - meeting the needs of the communities - is designed.
 12. Handling the corruption at macro-level is an uphill task and probably beyond the mandate of many organizations. Nevertheless, the humanitarian sector needs to align itself more with other players of civil society organizations so their voices get registered and later gain further vigor for their endeavors.
 13. The trend of hiring quality and accountability officers is heartening. This should be continued, and if organizations cannot afford to have a discreet slot for the purpose, the position should be embedded into M&E structure.
 14. In the light of greater than ever disasters in southern parts, the engagement of northern donors and agencies with their southern counterparts needs to be enhanced proportionally, if not exponentially. Commitment with humanitarian sector in the South should lead to more focused services provided by HAP and Sphere secretariats.

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ANNEXURE

Annexure: 1

1.1 List of People Interviewed/Meetings Attended From September 21, 2010 to March 04, 011

S. No.	Date	Interviewee/Meetings	Name of the Organization	Location
1	21-Sep-10	Saima, Shaukat and Naveed	CWS-P/A	CWS-P/A Office
2	22-Sep-10	Barb Wrigley	HAP	CWS-P/A Office
3	23-Sep-10	Kachkol Khan and others	Coordinator Citizen Action Committee	Shedo Village, Naushehro Feroze
4	24-Sep-10	SHA Meeting	Serena Hotel	Islamabad
5	3-Nov-10	Ashraf Mall	Tear Fund	CWS-P/A Office, Karachi
6	8-Nov-10	Dorothy Blane	Concern	Concern Office Islamabad
7	9-Nov-10	Mohd. Haleem and others	Innovation for Development Empower and Accessible Service	Madian
8	9-Nov-10	Mohd. Ayub and group	Bia Wadani Organization	Ingrid Abad
9	9-Nov-10	Iftikhar and Jahanzaib and others	IDPs and Community Workers	UC Bahrain
10	10-Nov-10	Azam Khan	Lasoonia	Swat
11	10-Nov-10	Zulfiqar Haider Malick	OXFAM	Swat
12	10-Nov-10	Amanullah and others	IDP	Swat
13	10-Nov-10	Khurshid Alam	ex-Councillor	Aspal Bande, Swat
14	11-Nov-10	Abdul Qadir	Resident and a patient at mobile clinic	Illahabad Village, ChaharBagh
15	11-Nov-10	Hazrat Nabi	Resident and a patient at mobile clinic	Illahabad Village, ChaharBagh
16	11-Nov-10	Amir Jan	Medical technician at mobile clinic	Dera Teshil Qabal, Swat
17	12-Nov-10	Kelly Wooster	Sphere Trainer	CWS-P/A Office, Islamabad
18	12-Nov-10	Ajmal Malick and Lubna Hashmat	CHIP	CHIP Office Islamabad
19	27-Nov-10	Aamir and Naveed Khyal	Indus Resource Center	IRC Office, Khairpur
20	27-Nov-10	Mr. Qureshi and others	Govt. Boys Primary School, Mori	Khairpur
21	27-Nov-10	Kalhore, Hanif, Sagar and Mahish	Flood Affected	Bund Area Khairpur

22	27-Nov-10	Ali Asghar and others	Flood Affected	Khairpur
23	27-Nov-10	Shakila Ruqqya, Waqar and others	Disaster Program Managers, IRC	Khairpur
24	28-Nov-10	Haji Ali Mohd Baber and others	IRC Tent City	Dadu
25	29-Nov-10	Bakht Khan, Ghulam Hyder	IRC Office	Dadu
26	29-Nov-10	Flood Affected (many)	School	Dadu
27	22-Dec-10	Dr. Manzoor Ahmed	Sungi	Islamabad Office
28	02 -Mar-2011	Shahbaz Malick	SPO	SPO Office
29	02- Mar-2011	Sahibzada Jawad	SAIBAAN	CWS-P/A Office
30	03-Mar-2011	Agha Jawad	NRSP	NRSP Office
31	03-Mar-2011	Maria Ahmed	IOM	IOM Office
32	04-Mar-2011	Zehra Arshad	PCE	PCE Office
33	04-Mar-2011	Fouzia Bilqis Malik	HRDN	HRDN Office
34		Farah Naz	PLAN	PLAN Office
35		Saeed-ur-Rehma	Haashr	Mansehra
36		Sajid Sharif	Help-in-Need	Bhisham

1.2 Participants of Focus Group Discussions, March 08, 2011

S. No.	Name of the Organization	Name of the Participant
1	Advocacy Support and Research Program	Imtiaz Ali Mangi
2	Al-Mehran Rural Development Organization	Attaullah Mallah
3	BASIC	Nisar Ali
4	Caritas Pakistan	Attasheel Asghar
5	Caritas Pakistan	Aqeel Emmanuel
6	CDO Trust Kotri	Shakeel Rasool Arain
7	CDO Trust Kotri	Qurban Pangrio
8	Civil Society Support Program	Mohd. Ali Abbasi
9	Green Rural Development Organization	Aijaz Ali Khuso
10	Human Rights Commission of Pakistan	Asho Thama
11	IIRE	Ayaz Chandio
12	IIRE	Qamar Shehzad
13	IIRE	Tabussum Ali
14	Indus Consultant Associates	Sajjad Hussain Larik
15	IRADO	Atta ur Rehman
16	Laar Humanitarian & Development Program	Niaz Hussain Bhatti
17	Participatory Village Development Program	Matthew Walfi
18	RDF	Syed Kazim Ali Shah
19	Root Work Foundation	Urooj Shoro
20	Research and Development for Human Resources	Maqbool Ahmed
21	Rural Development Policy Institute	Fida Somro
23	Sindh Agricultural and Forestry Workers Coordinating Organization	Warris Ali Shah
24	Sindh Agricultural and Forestry Workers Coordinating Organization	Saima Shah
25	SSEWA-PAK, Mirpurkhas	John Lawrence
26	Sindh Information Department- Government of Sindh	Zafar Ali Mangi
27	Sindh Information Department- Government of Sindh	Mohd Sabir Kaka
28	Sindh Community Foundation	Azar Niaz Chandio
29	Sindh Rural Support Program	Shahnaz
30	Sindh Rural Support Program	Annes Qadir Somro
31	Society for Health & Education and Social Work	Dr. Zulfiqar Ali
32	Society for Health & Education and Social Works	Mehran Khan Bhatti
33	Society for Health & Education and Social Works	Hussain Bux Laghari
34	Strengthening Participatory Organization	Qazi Arshad Hussain Siddiqui
35	Wilson Institute for Research & Empowerment	Rufin Wilson

1.3 Participants of ALWG Group Discussion, March 11, 2011

S. No.	Name of the Organization	Name of the Participant
1	CARE International	Shagufta Jeelani
2	Church World Service-Pakistan/Afghanistan	Rizwan Iqbal
3	OXFAM-NOVIB	Abida Swati
4	Save the Children International	Sameera Ashraf
5	SUNGI	Titus Prince

Annexure: 2 - Research Tools

2.1 Questionnaire: Organizations with Significant and Verifiable Q&A Capacities

1. Name of Organization: _____

2. Abbreviation (if any): _____

3. Type of Organization: A. Donor Agency B. UN Organization
 C. International NGO D. Pakistani NGO
 E. Other _____

4. How long this organization is working in Pakistan? __ (number of years)

5. Did this organization play any role in recent disasters? Mark 'Y' for yes and 'N' for no against each technical area and disaster.

	Assessment	Grant Making	Fundraising	Shelter	Camp Management	WASH	Food Aid	Health Services	Education	Logistics	Non-Food Items	Other (specify)	Other (specify)
2005 Earthquake													
2008 Balochistan Earthquake													
2009 Swat IDPs													
2010 Attabad Landslide													
2010 Tropical Cyclone "Phet"													
2010 Flood													

6. What are the standards your organization is following in 2010 Flood relief efforts?

- A. Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in humanitarian action (ALNAP)
- B. Emergency Capacity Building Project (ECB)
- C. HAP Humanitarian Accountability and Quality Management Standard
- D. Inter-Agency Network on Emergency Education (INEE)
- E. People in Aid
- F. Sphere Project Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response
- G. Other (specify) _____
- H. Other (specify) _____

7. What are the areas in which your organization is using Q&A principles? Mark 'Y' for yes and 'N' for no against each area and Q&A initiative.

	Sphere	HAP	Other
Disaster Preparedness			
Assessment			
Proposal Writing			
Fund Raising			
Grant Making			
Service Delivery			
Monitoring			
Evaluation			

8. Human Resource (programme/core/project staff):

	Pre-Flood As on 1 March 2010	During Flood-relief As on 1 Nov 2010
Total Staff		
Number of Staff dedicated for Q&A		
Number of Staff formally trained in Sphere		
Number of Staff formally trained in HAP		

9. Financial allocation on Q&A as percentage of organization's total budget:

A. 2011 or 2010-2011 _____ per cent

B. 2010 or 2009-2010 _____ per cent

C. 2009 or 2008-2009 _____ per cent

Form filled by

Name	Signature
Designation	Date

Annex 2.2: Checklists

A. Semi-structured interviews with relevant staff of organizations with Q&A capacities

Pre-Flood

- Organization's history and mandate
 - INGOs: Organization's history in Pakistan
- What types of Q&A capacities are present in the organization?
 - Q&A certification/ membership/ training/ exposure visits/ evaluations
- Collaboration with other organizations?
 - Joint-assessment, sectoral programming, etc.
- What was the process of achieving Q&A capacities?
- What is the HR capacity in Q&A?
- What motivated the organization to focus on Q&A?
- What was the expenditure on Q&A in 2008 and 2009?
- How much amount has been budgeted for Q&A in 2010?
- What are various Q&A systems and procedures in place?

Flood Relief

- What was the process of selection of the following:
 - Geographical area in which the organization is working
 - Role in relief work
 - Partners (donors/field implementing organizations)
- Was additional financial allocation made for Q&A?
- What is the relevance and appropriateness of Q&A principles?
- How are Q&A principles transmitted along the donor-INGO-NGO-beneficiary chain?
- What is the level of observance in different Q&A areas?
- What are the problems in observance?
- What works and what does not?

B. Semi-structured interviews with relevant staff of organizations with little or no Q&A capacities

Pre-Flood

- Organization's history, mandate and prior disaster response experience
- What is the size of organization
 - Financial outlay for 2008, 2009 and 2010
 - Human resource
 - Core programs and projects

Flood Relief

- What was the process of selection of the following:
 - Geographical area in which the organization is working
 - Role in relief work
 - Target group

- Partners (donors/field implementing organizations)
- How were resources (funds and relief goods) collected? by cyclical process
- Is your organization aware about Q&A principles? Any specific initiative?
- Were you told about Q&A principles by donor/INGO/NGO/Government/Visitors?
 - What is the relevance and appropriateness of Q&A principles?
- How do you make sure that your organization is working in the best interest of beneficiaries?

C. Semi-structured interviews with beneficiaries

Flood Relief

- Personal stories:
 - When and how flood occurred?
 - How it impacted the respondent and his/her family?
- Who were the initial responders? What was the rescue phase like?
- What was the experience of displacement?
 - How far did the respondent and his/her family have to move?
- What type of relief was provided to the respondent and his/her family?
- Details about the process:
 - Who provided relief?
 - How was relief provided? Was it systematic or ad hoc?
 - What was the degree of comfort in dealing with relief providers?
 - How much beneficiaries were consulted in
 - Assessment
 - Service delivery
 - Was there an effective complaints handling system?
 - Issues about dignity, privacy, transparency, fairness, etc.
- What were the gender concerns? How were they addressed during the relief phase?
- How were children treated during the relief phase?
- How were disabled treated during the relief phase?

D. Semi-structured interviews with disaster response experts

- What is the state of humanitarian sector in Pakistan?
- Compared to the 2005 Earthquake, how do you see the relief phase of 2010 Floods?
- In Pakistani context, how relevant and appropriate are Q&A principles?
- Is Q&A seen as something imposed by donor agencies and INGOs?
- What are the problems in observance? What are the ways around?
- What works here? And what does not?
- What is the way ahead for Q&A?

E. E-mail interviews with Disaster Response Experts

- What are the challenges/constraints in promotion of Q&A values in Pakistan?
- What are the causes of the challenges that you have identified?
- What should be done to overcome the identified challenges?

Annexure 3 : Findings of the Quantitative Survey

A. Respondents

International NGO	8
Pakistani NGO	4
Total	12

B. Presence in Pakistan (in years)

Mean	19
Std Dev	13
Min	5
Max	50

C. Role played in Disaster Response

	Assessment	Grant Making	Fundraising	Shelter	Camp Management	WASH	Food Aid	Health Services	Education	Logistics	Non-Food Items	Child Protection	Psycho-social Services
2010 Flood	12	4	10	11	5	12	11	10	5	7	10	2	1
2010 Tropical Cyclone "Phet"	4	1	1	2	0	1	1	2	1	2	3	1	1
2010 Attabad Landslide	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2009 Swat IDPs	11	5	8	4	0	8	7	8	4	3	9	2	2
2008 Balochistan Earthquake	8	1	2	5	2	4	4	4	0	3	7	0	1
2005 Earthquake	11	4	6	9	4	9	8	9	7	5	9	2	2

D. Q&A Standards followed in 2010 Flood response

ALNAP	1
ECB	2
HAP	5
INEE	2
People in Aid	3
Sphere	12
Red Cross	2

E. Use of Q&A Standards

	Sphere	HAP
Disaster Preparedness	9	4
Assessment	10	5
Proposal Writing	10	6
Fund Raising	4	4
Grant Making	3	2
Service Delivery	7	5
Monitoring	9	5
Evaluation	9	5

F. Human Resource

	Pre-Flood As on 1 March 2010	During Flood relief As on 1 Nov 2010
Total Staff	1,398	2,479
Number of Staff dedicated for Q&A	120	207
Number of Staff formally trained in Sphere	112	149
Number of Staff formally trained in HAP	105	144

G. Financial Allocation on Q&A: One percent to three percent of annual budget

Annexure: 4

A CHRONOLOGY OF THE CODES, INITIATIVES, AND STANDARDS IN HUMANITARIAN SECTOR WORLDWIDE

- 1. International Organization for Standardisation (ISO) GENEVA SWITZERLAND (1947)**
The ISO is a worldwide federation that has published standards covering a wide range of areas. ISO is a network of the national standards institutes of 163 countries, one member per country, with a Central Secretariat in Geneva, Switzerland, that coordinates the system.
- 2. Australian Council for International Development (ACFID) Code of Conduct: AUSTRALIA (1986 as ACFOA)**
(ACFOA) produced a voluntary code of ethics for nongovernmental development organizations (NGDOs) in 1986. ACFOA becomes ACFID (Australian Council for International Development) in March 2004. ACFID Code of Conduct sets out standards on how organizations are managed, how they communicate with the public, and how they spend the funds they raise. In making sure that organizations are accountable, the Code ensures that public confidence is maintained in the way funds are used overseas and in Australia. A new Code of Conduct was passed unanimously by ACFID Council in October 2010 and will come into effect in January 2012, replacing the existing Code.
- 3. NGO Watch Article on Philippine Council for NGO Certification: PHILIPPINES (1991)**
Article charting progress of registration of Philippine NGOs since the 1990s government threatened to remove tax relief unless they could demonstrate a level of accountability.
- 4. European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) Excellence Model (1992)**
It was developed as the framework for assessing organizations for the European Quality Award. It is now the most widely used organizational framework in Europe and it has become the basis for the majority of national and regional Quality Awards.

The EFQM Excellence Model is a non-prescriptive framework based on nine criteria. Five of these are 'Enablers' (Leadership, People, Policy & Strategy, Partnerships & Resources, and Processes) and four are 'Results' (People Results, Customer Results, Society Results, and Key Performance Results). The 'Enabler' criteria cover what an organization does. The 'Results' criteria cover what an organization achieves. 'Results' are caused by 'Enablers' and 'Enablers' are improved using feedback from 'Results.'
- 5. InterAction's PVO Standards (1992)**
The PVO (Private Voluntary Organization) Standards Committee works with member organizations in promoting standards for PVOs in the areas of governance, finance, communications with the US public, management practice, human resources, program, and public policy. Compliance with the PVO Standards is a requirement for admission to

InterAction. The Committee works within the InterAction network and disseminates our standard setting experience to other coalitions and audiences around the world.

6. Coordination SUD: PARIS (1994)

Coordination SUD brings together one hundred thirty NGOs who not only carry out humanitarian emergency response, development assistance, protection of the environment (ecology) of human rights among disadvantaged populations, but also educational activities for international solidarity and advocacy.

7. Code of Conduct for The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief (1994)

It represents a huge leap forward in setting standards for disaster response. It is being used by the International Federation to monitor its own standards of relief delivery and to encourage other agencies to set similar standards.

8. Association of Development Agencies in Bangladesh (ADAB) Code of Ethics: BANGLADESH (1994)

ADAB is a membership organization which adopted its Code of Ethics in 1994 as part of a wider debate concerning the role of NGOs in Bangladesh, which included government-level discussions as to how best support and regulate their actions.

9. Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance in Rwanda (JEEAR) DENMARK (1994)

Unprecedented evaluation of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and NGO responses to the humanitarian catastrophe

10. Accountability AA1000 Framework (1995)

The AA1000 Series is a set of standards, guidelines, and user notes based on observed and achievable practice, and intended to provide the basis for improving the sustainability performance of organizations. Underlying the AA1000 Series is the principle of inclusivity, which recognizes the right of stakeholders to be heard and the obligation of organizations to respond.

11. People In Aid Code of Good Practice in the Management & Support of Aid Personnel (1997)

The Code is a tool to help agencies offer better development aid and disaster relief to communities in need, and is an important part of their efforts to improve standards, accountability, and transparency amid the challenges of disaster, conflict, and poverty. As well as building on previous guidelines, the Code reflects the growing attention of aid groups on issues of health and safety, diversity and equality, and is relevant for agencies engaged in development and advocacy as well as emergency response.

12. Active Learning Network for Accountability & Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP): LONDON (1997)

ALNAP was established in 1997, following the multi-agency evaluation of the Rwandan



genocide. It is a collective response by the humanitarian sector, dedicated to improving humanitarian performance through increased learning and accountability. ALNAP- is a mechanism to provide a forum on learning, accountability, and performance issues for the humanitarian sector, following the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (JEEAR).

13. Global Reporting Initiative (GRI): USA (1997)

The Global Reporting Initiative's vision is that reporting on economic, environmental, and social performance by all organizations becomes as routine and comparable as financial reporting. GRI accomplishes this vision by developing, continually improving, and building capacity around the use of its Sustainability Reporting Framework. An international network of thousands from business, civil society, labor, and professional institutions create the content of the Reporting Framework in a consensus-seeking process.

14. Sphere Project: GENEVA, SWITZERLAND (1997)

The Sphere Project was launched in 1997 by a group of humanitarian NGOs and the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement. Sphere is based on two core beliefs: first, that all possible steps should be taken to alleviate human suffering arising out of calamity and conflict, and second, that those affected by disaster have a right to life with dignity and therefore a right to assistance. Sphere is three things: a handbook, a broad process of collaboration, and an expression of commitment to quality and accountability.

15. Social Accountability International: (1997)

SAI is an international non-profit human rights organization dedicated to the ethical treatment of workers around the world. SAI's social standard, SA8000, functions as a highly effective and expedient system for delivering improved social performance to businesses and their supply chain facilities. The SA8000 solution is designed to ensure compliance with the highest ethical sourcing standards by integrating management tools that serve the needs of workers and businesses alike.

16. Practical Quality Assurance System for Small Organizations (PQASSO) (1997)

Developed by Charities' Evaluation Services, PQASSO is a voluntary self-assessment tool for small organizations, or for projects in larger organizations. It encompasses twelve areas of quality: planning; governance; management; user-centred service; staff and volunteers; training and development; managing money; managing resources; managing activities; networking and partnership; monitoring and evaluation; and results.

17. Oxfam Stakeholder Survey: (1998)

2000 survey which arose out of Oxfam's Strategic Review (completed in 1998) as one of the recommendations on governance and accountability.

18. Code of Conduct for NGOs in Ethiopia ADIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA (1999)

The Code of Conduct for NGOs in Ethiopia was developed collectively by various NGOs in Ethiopia in 1998 and endorsed by almost all NGOs that are operational in the country.

19. The Humanitarian Policy Group: (1999)

The Humanitarian Policy Group of the British Overseas Development Institute (ODI) has taken a leading role in research and publishing on many areas of humanitarian policy and practice, including the debate on quality and accountability. It is a team of independent researchers and information professionals working on humanitarian issues. It is dedicated to improving humanitarian policy and practice through a combination of high-quality analysis, dialogue, and debate.

20. UN Global Compact, GENEVA (2000)

The United Nations Global Compact is a strategic policy initiative for businesses that are committed to aligning their operations and strategies with ten universally accepted principles in the areas of human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption. Through the power of collective action, the Global Compact seeks to promote responsible corporate citizenship so that business can be part of the solution to the challenges of globalization. In this way, the private sector - in partnership with other social actors - can help realize the Secretary-General's vision: a more sustainable and inclusive global economy.

21. Partnership Programme Agreements (PPAs): UK (2000)

PPAs are agreements between DFID and influential civil society organizations in the UK which set out at a strategic level how the two partners will work together to meet the Millennium Development Goals. Strategic funding is provided, and is linked to jointly agreed outcomes.

22. Global Accountability Project (GAP) (2001)

It was developed with the aim of enhancing the accountability of decision making processes of inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), transnational corporations (TNCs), and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) to the individuals and communities they affect. The Global Accountability Project (GAP) is part of the Accountability Programme at the One World Trust which aims to generate wider commitment to the principles and values of accountability; increase the accountability of global organizations to those they affect; and strengthen the capacity of civil society to better engage in decision making processes.

23. Ugandan NGO Forum Code of Conduct KAMPALA (2001)

The Code of Conduct provides for the self-discipline, regulation, and mechanism of restraint for NGOs and CBOs operating in Uganda.

24. Emergency Capacity Building Project (ECB) (2003)

A collaborative effort of seven humanitarian agencies that are jointly tackling common problems in emergency response and preparedness, addressing issues pertaining to staff capacity, accountability (primarily to affected populations), impact measurement, risk reduction, and the use of information and technology in emergencies. While seeking to improve the way the seven agencies respond to humanitarian crises, ECB is deeply

committed to contributing to reform in the humanitarian sector as a whole. ECB will work closely with other humanitarian organizations and share findings widely.

25. The Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD): (2003)

The Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative is an informal donor forum and network which facilitates collective advancement of GHD principles and good practices. It recognizes that, by working together, donors can more effectively encourage and stimulate principled donor behaviour and, by extension, improved humanitarian action.

26. Humanitarian Accountability Partnership - International (HAP-I) GENEVA, SWITZERLAND (2003)

HAP was established to promote voluntary compliance with HAP's Accountability Principles, designed to promote this vision. To achieve a reasonable degree of consistency and equity in compliance monitoring, complaints-handling, and quality assurance certification it was necessary to develop a set of relevant, measurable, actionable and affordable performance benchmarks, set within an explicit framework of shared values that define the quality of humanitarian action for those seeking to comply with the HAP Accountability Principles.

Because the founding members of HAP did not incorporate a statement of humanitarian values in the Accountability Principles, the Humanitarian Accountability Covenant has been developed to provide a simple statement of the basic values against which HAP certified agencies wish to be held to account.

27. Quality COMPAS FRANCE (2004)

The Quality COMPAS is the result of a six-year research project on quality issues in the humanitarian sector. The Quality COMPAS is a Quality Assurance method which comes equipped with its own set of tools, training modules and consultancy services. These components have been designed specifically for aid agencies with the overall aim of improving services provided to crisis-affected populations.

28. Afghanistan NGO Code of Conduct: KABUL (2005)

It was a response to accusations that NGOs had misused funds allocated for post-war Afghanistan.

29. European Commission Code of Conduct for Non-Profit Organizations to Promote Transparency and Accountability Best Practices (2005)

A voluntary code developed in 2005 primarily to guard against the exploitation of organizations for the financing of terrorism.

30. Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (2005)

An independent, learning, and accountability initiative in the humanitarian sector. It was established in February 2005 in the wake of the December 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunamis. TEC evaluations represent the most intensive study of a humanitarian response since the Rwanda multi-donor evaluation in the mid-1990s.

31. International NGOs' Accountability Charter (2006)

Global accountability charter signed by eleven of the world's leading advocacy NGOs in June 2006.

32. Accountability, Learning, and Planning System (ALPS): (Not sure about the year of commencement)

The Accountability, Learning, and Planning System (Alps) is used by ActionAid International to lay out a framework for involving communities and partner organizations closely in all aspects of their program work, including planning, budgeting, monitoring, and reviewing. The system aims to put economically poor people at the center of learning, analyzing, and responding to their own situation. Alps, therefore, places a strong emphasis on developing and strengthening downward accountability to stakeholders on the ground.

Source: Compilation from various websites

Annexure: 5 - News Items

1. The Politics of Relief: Aliens in their Own Land

By: ABDUL MANAN

Published: August 18, 2010

500 flood survivors from Ahmadiya community denied shelter, relief goods

The government and local clerics refused to shelter around 500 flood-affected families belonging to the Ahmadiya community in South Punjab's relief camps. Not only that, the government also did not send relief goods to the flood-hit areas belonging to the Ahmadiya community, The Express Tribune has learnt during a visit to the devastated Punjab districts of Muzaffargarh, Dera Ghazi Khan and Rajanpur.

For its part, the government claims that all relief goods are being distributed among survivors without discrimination. And that all survivors have been sheltered in relief camps without distinction. The flood-devastated families from the Ahmadiya community have strongly criticised the government's "discriminatory attitude" even at a time when the entire country is reeling from the ravages of the worst flooding in living memory.

Of the 500 Ahmadi families, 350 belong to DG Khan, 60 to Muzaffargarh and 65 to Rajanpur district. According to Ahmadiya community leaders, over 2,500 members of their community have been displaced and are now living with their relatives while some of them have left for Rabwah, the community's headquarters.

Aziz Ahmad Khan, a local leader of flood victims from the Ahmadiya community in DG Khan, told *The Express Tribune* that all members of his family have complained of discrimination in DG Khan. He said 200 families from Basti Rindan and Basti Sohrani, 60 from Chah Ismaeel Wala, three from Rakh Mor Jangi, 18 from Ghazi Ghat and 12 from Jhakar Imam Shah of Ahmadpur. Khan alleged that 200 families, who have been displaced from Basti Rindan and Basti Sohrani by flooding, took shelter in a state-run school at Jhok Utra but within days the local administration forced them to leave the school. He said the local administration later told them that people from the surrounding areas did not want the Ahmadis in the relief camp. And that the administration could not allow them to stay at the camp as it could create a law and order situation.

"So we left our cattle and other belongings in the area and took refuge in the homes of our community members on higher grounds," he said, adding that some of them even migrated to Chanabnagar.

Muhammad Iqbal Sohrani, a member of the Ahmadiya community told *The Express Tribune* that around 40 Ahmadi families who took shelter in a state-run school at Jhakar Imam Shah near Sumandri, some 40 kilometres from DG Khan, have not received any relief either from philanthropists or from the government. He alleged that relief packages were being distributed through local lawmakers who have been told by the district administration that the Ahmadis are not eligible for any support.

Saleem Chandia, another Ahmadiya community member, said that he along with 40 other community members rented a house but after two days their landlord was forced by local clerics to evict them. Chandia said they were offered help by their own community members after wandering for several days in search of shelter.

Mansoor Ahmad, a resident of Muzaffargarh, told *The Express Tribune* that over 800 members of the Ahmadiya community were displaced from Bait Nasirabad, Masroornagar, Hussainwala and Shahjamal. At least 100 members of the community, from Hussainwala and Masroorabad, were trapped at Shahjamal. He claimed that they had asked the district police officer (DPO) and the district coordination officer (DCO) to provide them a boat or to rescue the trapped people but they did not take notice.

Ahmad claimed that the trapped Ahmadis were rescued by their fellows on a broken boat. He said local clerics have issued an edict that the Ahmadis should not be provided help.

Naseem Ahmad, from Rajanpur, told *The Express Tribune* that their 500 community members from the areas of Basti Lashari, Basti Allahdad Dareeshak and from Basti Azizabad were displaced. Their houses were washed away and the government and local clerics ignored them. He said that they were not allowed to stay in state-run schools or in camps, therefore the majority of them were living on the rooftops of their inundated houses.

“The Ahmadiya community itself rescued trapped people and delivered relief to them,” community spokesperson Saleem-ul-Din told *The Express Tribune* by phone.

He said that the community did not want any relief package from the government for its members. However, the government should protect the property and livestock of the Ahmadis.

Hassan Iqbal, Commissioner DG Khan, told *The Express Tribune* that he would check the situation. He asked the Ahmadis to directly approach him if they face discrimination anywhere in the district. However, DCO Muzaffargarh Farasat Iqbal said that the Ahmadis have not contacted him.

Published in The Express Tribune, August 18th, 2010.

2. Role of NGOs in Flood Relief

By: DR ABID QAIYUM SULERI

Published: September 4, 2010

The writer heads the Sustainable Development Policy Institute, a non-profit policy think-tank abid.suleri@tribune.com.pk

Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani said rather disappointingly in his hometown of Multan recently that 80 per cent of the flood aid would come through the NGOs and not his government and that of this the NGOs would misuse at least half. He further said that this would instead be spent on bullet-proof cars and luxury expenses, as if those who work in the NGOs were ministers.



The prime minister claimed that had aid come through the government, it would have contributed something from its own resources and would have spent all of it for relief and rehabilitation of flood survivors. The remarks against the NGOs constitute an extremely serious allegation, especially since the head of the government made it. And he did it against those who have been bailing not only him but his predecessors as well by helping the people of Pakistan be it in a flood, earthquake, the IDP crisis or drought.

The NGOs that the prime minister is referring to are in fact non-profit organizations (NPOs). They are humanitarian organizations, charity groups, and relief providers both local and international who in majority of the cases have missionary zeal and volunteerism. These are the groups who put their lives in danger, and despite repeated attacks on their staff members and offices in the recent past they have continued to serve the people of Pakistan. Unlike the so-called “people’s representatives”, their staffers don’t distance themselves from the masses, hence they don’t use bullet-proof vehicles. In their budgets they cannot charge more than 20 per cent on personnel costs and have to be mindful of delivering in a cost-effective manner. Unlike our ministers (existing and former) they don’t use these funds to pay the golf club membership of their cronies. And neither do they spend funds meant for export promotion on buying expensive cell phones. I would suggest that kitchen cabinet of the current government be sent on an immersion course, a real-life training where they should work with these organizations in providing relief during various emergency situation to get a feel of the ‘luxury lives’ that these relief providers have.

It would be good if the government leadership and its imported economic wizards were to try and understand why people have blind faith in organizations such as the Edhi Foundation, the Shaukat Khanum Trust, the Khwaja Ghareeb Nawaz Foundation, and the Rural Support Programmes and so on. They should also try to figure out why international humanitarian organizations such as Oxfam, Actionaid, Muslim Hands, Islamic Relief, Mercy Corps, Church World Services, Catholic Relief and so on are able to generate and mobilise funds. All of these national and international organizations have established their credibility. They are accountable to their donors. People trust them and they provide relief without discriminating on the basis of race, ethnicity, creed, gender, colour and nationality. They work on selfless basis and don’t try to inundate others to save their properties. The irony is that many of those who work in these NGOs have played an active role for restoration of democracy and in the reinstating of the judiciary.

The prime minister should be told — preferably by the NDMA— the difference between consulting firms and non- profit organizations. He should be told that those who work for flood relief and rescue are the former and not the latter. The prime minister should apologise to the representatives of NGOs for his remarks and his government should hold a meeting to learn just how and why the NGOs were able to mobilise 80 per cent of the funds coming for flood relief.

Published in The Express Tribune, September 4th, 2010.

3. Donors Need Assurance of Transparency before giving out Billions

By: SHAHBAZ RANA
Published: October 8, 2010

Pakistan asked to design a well-researched reconstruction plan

ISLAMABAD: The international community has forwarded half a dozen questions before it can give billions of dollars for reconstruction of flood-affected areas in order to ensure transparency and good governance amid mounting concerns about corruption in Pakistan.

United States Coordinator for Economic and Development Assistance, Robin Raphel, raised a set of questions to be answered in the upcoming meeting of the Pakistan Development Forum, scheduled for mid-November in Islamabad. The conference agenda is to sell reconstruction plans to the donors.

She was speaking at a symposium on the role of donors in meeting development challenges in post-flood Pakistan.

“There is a longstanding concern over corruption and all the donors want to ensure transparency,” said Raphel, adding in the wake of global meltdown, mobilising international assistance would be challenging, hinting at donors’ fatigue who themselves are facing budget constraints after the 2008 financial crisis.

The worst-ever floods in the country’s history have inundated one-fifth of Pakistan and have affected one-tenth of the population. Preliminary estimates have put the damage at over \$7 billion and the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank are carrying out a damage and needs assessment which will be completed this month.

Donors have shown reluctance in giving cash to Pakistan. So far against a revised United Nations appeal for \$2 billion for early recovery, a mere \$58 million have been disbursed. The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank have committed \$1 billion and \$2 billion respectively but this money too is not new rather they will reallocate their resources from ongoing projects.

Raphel said the donors need to know about a well-researched reconstruction plan with clarity in projects. She said the reconstruction plan needs to include basic policy guidelines on relocating the educational and health facilities.

“For donors it is essential to know who would be responsible for designing and implementing the projects and if it is provincial government then who at the provincial level is responsible and whether the authority has the capacity to perform the gigantic task,” she added.

Raphel said the donors were also concerned about overlapping and duplication of work and wanted a clear roadmap. She said there should also be clear boundary between the early recovery and reconstruction phase and in what way the reconstruction process would be monitored.

“We want answers to these questions in the development forum meeting,” she said, adding any development assistance should be well spent and should also go towards economic reforms.

Raphel said the donors wanted to be sure that their money would not be wasted and they also wanted Islamabad to mobilise its own resources.

The international donors are pressing Pakistan to push ahead with the tax reforms in order to generate additional revenues. However, the government is again planning to overburden existing taxpayers by levying a one-off flood surcharge instead of broadening the tax base.

“Pakistan is generous in philanthropic activities but the government needs revenues.” She said Pakistan should avoid untargeted subsidies and transfer more assets from the public to private sector.

“Flood surcharge is not a solution to the problem. The government should revive wealth tax to tax the land and large cars,” said Dr Hafeez Pasha, former finance minister.

Published in The Express Tribune ,October 8th, 2010.

4. Pakistan, Donors in Row over Utilisation of Loans

By: SHAHBAZ RANA
Published: October 14, 2010

ADB, WB shifting funds from ongoing projects

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan has locked horns with international financial institutions over the mechanism for utilisation of \$3 billion worth of loans and diversion of funds from ongoing projects to reconstruction efforts in flood-hit areas.

The tussle between Pakistan, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank (WB) may delay an early launch of the reconstruction phase as the fate of the entire flood aid now hangs in the balance.

Sources in the finance ministry said the government has taken exception to the ADB’s decision to shift approximately \$1.5 billion from ongoing projects to flood-related reconstruction projects. The Manila-based agency has announced that it will provide \$2 billion for the multi-billion-dollar reconstruction phase.

The government has also opposed the ADB’s demand for powers to award contracts and for procurement and monitoring rights, sources said. It would write a note to the ADB, seeking reconsideration of the request for sweeping powers of tendering, procurement and monitoring of reconstruction projects, they added.

The floods began in late July in the wake of unusually heavy monsoon rains, affecting one-fifths of the country's total area with around 20 million survivors.

Nearly 2,000 people died, while millions were left homeless, according to the United Nations.

Dozens of bridges had been washed away while more than 1.9 million homes were damaged and destroyed. Around 5.9 million acres of farmland was damaged, a severe blow to agriculture, the most important pillar of the economy.

Transparency Questioned

The international community has expressed concern over transparent use of money. Both the WB and ADB are mostly diverting funds from ongoing projects instead of committing entirely new loans.

The World Bank has announced that it will give \$997.5 million for the reconstruction drive, but it too will divert \$300 million from the already committed Poverty Reduction Support Credit. This credit has been withheld for the past several months because of Pakistan's inability to increase its power tariffs and levy the reformed General Sales Tax.

The ADB's \$2 billion is a blend of concessionary and commercial loans. Juan Miranda, Regional Director General of the ADB, recently said: "We will pay against progress," underlining the need for ensuring transparency in use of donor money.

Sources in the finance ministry questioned the move, saying how can the government give spending powers to the ADB when it has to repay the loan. "The ADB's demand to appoint a contract management consultant with sweeping powers is unjustified," a source said.

"We were expecting that Pakistan's bureaucracy will resist transparency measures," said a senior ADB official on condition of anonymity.

He said the idea behind the demand seeking procurement and monitoring powers was to check corruption and ensure swift implementation of projects.

He said the decision to take out \$1.5 billion from the current portfolio was taken after witnessing slow progress on these projects. Some 10 to 12 projects have been marked as 'slow moving'. The bank also wanted to shelve 15 projects but faced resistance from provincial governments.

Finance ministry sources said the donors were taking out money committed till 2012 and if the government utilised this money ahead of time it would create difficulties in foreign loan repayments in coming years.

Published in The Express Tribune, October 14th, 2010.

5. Donor fatigue or trust deficit?

By: RAHIMULLAH YUSUFZAI

Published: Tuesday, August 10, 2010

Concern is being expressed everywhere in Pakistan that the response of our people towards the plight of the flood-affectedees isn't very enthusiastic compared to past crises. It is being observed that individuals and organizations aren't donating much to help those uprooted by the floods and deprived of their livelihoods. The October 2005 earthquake and the largest displacement in the country's history last year following the military operations in Swat and the rest of Malakand division and the tribal areas are cited as great examples of the indomitable Pakistani spirit and largely unacknowledged generosity to collectively tackle and overcome challenges faced by the nation.

This observation is largely true, though the campaign to help the flood-affected communities is picking up. It seems more people are making up their mind to assist the affectees as they come to realise the massive scale of the devastation caused by the torrential rains and record floods. Some of the reasons for the hitherto less enthusiastic response of the general public towards the suffering of the affectees could be the 'donor fatigue' that may have set in due to the endless crises that Pakistan is facing. Due to the stagnating economy, the capacity of the common people to donate in cash and kind has also been reduced.

Besides, many Pakistanis who were among the donors during the previous man-made and natural disasters are now part of the communities that have suffered losses due to the floods. Charsadda and Nowshera, the worse-affected districts in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province along with Swat and Shangla in the recent floods, had generously hosted internally displaced persons from Swat and Malakand for months in 2009 and lessened the burden of the government. Together with the residents of Mardan, Swabi and Peshawar districts, common villagers in Charsadda and Nowshera had opened their doors and hearts to even strangers in a remarkable example of sharing and caring. Now these people themselves are in need as their homes have been washed away by floodwater or made unliveable and their livelihoods have been destroyed. One has heard stories of affectees making the remark that they used to give Zakat, but would now be accepting Zakat.

Another important reason for the sluggish response to appeals for donations for the flood affectees seems to be the low credibility of the ruling elite. The prime minister's relief fund wasn't attracting many donations. In Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, information minister Mian Iftikhar Hussain expressed unhappiness over the poor response of the federal government and the international donors to the relief fund set up in the name of the chief minister and even warned that the provincial government would refuse to accept untimely and delayed help. Government departments and semi-government and autonomous organizations would surely put their donations in these official funds, but expecting the common people to do so would be futile. Foreign donors also prefer the UN, WFP, ICRC and some of the reputed western nongovernmental organizations while donating money and goods for relief work.

The sentiments of common people wishing to donate money for the cause of flood affectees were aptly summed in this letter to the editor published in The News on August 9. “The overseas Pakistanis like me are ready to help the flood-affected people in whatever way we can, but we are extremely reluctant to contribute our money to the government or prime minister’s funds for reasons which need no repetition,” wrote Qasim Kazmi from Sharjah. Overseas Pakistanis like him in the Gulf States and the well-to-do Pakistani diaspora present in many countries of the world have the capacity to help their hapless countrymen and women, but they would like to give their money to trusted people and organizations. If Pakistanis are reluctant to trust their rulers with money, one cannot expect foreigners to repose confidence in them and be sure that their assistance would be honestly spent.

The ruling elite have to lead by example to become credible and convince the people that they are trustworthy. Many among them have a tainted past and are still facing cases of corruption. Among them are fabulously rich industrialists, landowners and others with no visible source of income and yet in possession of unimaginable assets. Some have made public donations for the flood affectees, but the amounts are small and much less than their paying capacity. President Asif Ali Zardari, Mian Nawaz Sharif and most leading politicians are very rich and could pay substantial amounts of money for the flood affectees and in the process prompt their wealthy party colleagues to make donations.

Much has been said and written about President Zardari’s absence from the country when it was suffering from the most devastating floods in its history. It would be naïve to expect him to act differently this time when he failed to visit Swat or the tribal areas during record displacement of people and meet troops conducting military operations despite being the commander-in-chief of the country’s armed forces. Elected for five years, enjoying majority in parliament and still able to keep his political allies on his side, he doesn’t have to worry much about losing power. This is how most Pakistani rulers and ruling parties behave after coming to power.

One doesn’t believe that the government’s response or management of the crisis created by the floods would have been any better had President Zardari been around and leading the rescue and relief efforts. In fact, a presidential visit to flood-ravaged places would have been bothersome and costly due to security concerns for our insecure president. All such VVIP visits are rather a waste of time and resources and should be best avoided. Government officials, the police and even rescue workers are tied up when such visits take place and their time and resources are wasted in ensuring security and protocol for the dignitaries. Rather than pushing the VVIPs to visit sites of a tragedy or emergency and come to a hospital to meet the injured, it would be better to keep them out of such situations. Like the ‘blue book’ containing rules concerning security and protocol procedures for VVIPs on the move, we should have another book detailing situations where VVIPs should have no role and presence.

Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani’s visit to Mianwali caused him embarrassment instead of creating any goodwill for him or benefiting his PPP government. Wearing his designer sunglasses, he used a motorboat to visit the affected areas and was then brought to a medical relief camp. As reported by the media, the camp was wound up and the crowd paid some money as soon as the prime minister left. This is how some of the VVIP visits are arranged, hiring the participants and making a feel-good atmosphere. Shahbaz Sharif, or for that matter Nawaz Sharif using Punjab government

resources, performed much better than Gilani and walked deeper into the flooded areas and mixed more with the affectees. But it wasn't a good idea for Shahbaz Sharif to dole out money to some old women seeking his attention in front of television cameras.

In Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, the provincial government failed to implement its orders regarding protocol for ministers visiting flood-affected areas. Ministers were seen moving with a number of vehicles escorted by the police. Chief Minister Ameer Haider Hoti had to calm down angry affectees as he met them in relief camps in Nowshera and Charsadda after flying in a helicopter. People felt letdown not only due to the inadequate rescue and relief activities of the government but also its failure to issue a timely warning about the above-normal monsoon rains and the expected flooding. In faraway Swat, Shangla, Kohistan, Dir and Tank districts, people are angry that they have been ignored as the Peshawar valley was getting all the attention of the government and donors. The suffering affectees would be impressed if their rulers agree to suffer with them in the absence of electricity and basic services and walk in the mud even if their spotless clean clothes become dirty. As this isn't going to happen, embarking on those brief VVIP trips is an exercise in futility.

ABOUT CHURCH WORLD SERVICE- PAKISTAN/AFGHANISTAN

Church World Service-Pakistan/Afghanistan is an international nongovernmental organization which implements humanitarian and development activities across Pakistan and Afghanistan. Since 1954, CWS-P/A has worked for the development and relief of marginalized communities on the basis that all individuals irrespective of race, faith, color, sex, economic status, or political opinion have the right to choose how to live. The organization assists communities to achieve economic prosperity and improve human and social capital through participatory endeavors, which liberate families and enhance their capacities to take control over their lives. Committed to quality performance, human rights, right to access information, and right to complain, CWS-P/A ensures that its humanitarian and development initiatives provide communities with their pertinent right and authority over resources.

Currently, CWS-P/A operates from its central office in Karachi and additional offices in Islamabad, Lahore, Mansehra, and Swat in Pakistan and Jalalabad and Kabul in Afghanistan. It also runs a training center in Murree, Pakistan. Projects are organized out of its three programs: Capacity Building Program, Disaster Management Program, and Social Development Program. CWS-P/A's thematic priorities include: emergency response; water, sanitation, and the environment; health; education; livelihoods; peace and governance; and quality and accountability.

With a network of close to four hundred partners, CWS-P/A adopts various approaches for project implementation. The organization can either be fully or semi-operational or work directly with an implementing partner depending on the type of initiative. This versatility enables CWS-P/A to cater to a wide range of initiatives within the scope of its thematic areas according to the needs of the communities, thus, preserving their dignity, self-reliance, participation, and ownership.

Globally, CWS-P/A is part of CWS, Inc. and is registered with both the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Locally, it has a distinct identity through its advisory board, diverse national staff, and strong linkages with local/regional networks and partnerships. In 2005, CWS-P/A received ISO 9001:2000 (revised to ISO 9001:2008) accreditation and the following year was awarded USAID management standards certification. CWS-P/A is a member of the ACT Alliance. In 2008, CWS-P/A became a full member of the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership and received HAP certification in 2011. CWS-P/A is also a signatory to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Code of Conduct for NGOs in Disaster Relief.



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